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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code
§78-2-2(3) (j) and §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW/STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review by American on its crossappeal are:
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to award attorney's

fees and certain court costs to New West Federal Savings and Loan
Association ("New West")?
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to find USLife Title

Insurance

Company

("USLife")

and

Guardian

Title

Company

("Guardian") liable for punitive damages, reserving the issue of
the financial condition of USLife and Guardian and the ultimate
amount of punitive damages for future factual determination?
The

standard

of review

for issues determined

judgment is set forth in English v. Kienke, 774

by summary

P2d 1154 (Utah

App 1989) :
Our analytical standard for review of a summary judgment is
the same as that of the trial court: we review the facts and
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the
losing party. If we conclude that a genuine issue of material
fact exists, the summary judgment will be overturned and the
case remanded for further proceedings on that issue. Where
no material facts remain unresolved, we examine the trial
court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness.
English v. Kienke at 1156, citations omitted.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Statutes and rules whose interpretation is determinative are:
1.

Utah Code Ann. S31A-20-110(1).
1

4.

Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308.

5.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.

6.

Utah Rules of Civ. Pro., Rule 56(c).

Copies of these statutes and rules are included within the
addendum hereto as Exhibits "A" to "F", respectively.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is

an

action

against

USLife,

a

title

insurance

underwriter, and Guardian, a title insurance agent who issued an
ALTA

lenders

("American").
position

policy

to American

Savings

and Loan

Association

The policy insured American's trust deed in a first

priority.

American's

trust

deed

was

subsequently

foreclosed by Scenic Rail Credit Union ("Scenic Rail") whose trust
deed was senior to American's trust deed.

A claim was submitted

to USLife and Guardian and it was denied. American sued USLife and
Guardian under various contractual theories and tort theories, both
under the policy and outside the policy.

The trial court granted

American's summary judgment on the issues of liability and damages
but denied American's request for attorney's fees, punitive damages
and certain court costs.

This summary judgment is being appealed

by USLife and Guardian and cross-appealed as to attorney's fees,
punitive damages and court costs by American.
Because of a supervised reorganization of American by the
federal government, the plaintiff was changed from American to New
West just prior to appeal.

Further, USLife was placed under a

state supervised receiver/liquidator in Texas shortly after its
appeal

was

commenced.

By

order
3

of

this

court,

the

receiver/liquidator, Mr. Stephen S. Durish, was substituted as a
party for USLife.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. M. Lynn Strong and Cherie G. Strong (the " Strongs") owned
a single family residence located at 7629 South 835 East, Midvale,
Utah (the "property").
2.

[Record, page 375.]

On December 30, 1983, the Strongs obtained a loan in the

amount of $31,300.00 from Scenic Rail.

Scenic Rail secured the

loan with a trust deed on the property which trust deed was
entitled

"Second Trust Deed".

This trust deed was recorded on

February

14, 1984 in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office.

[Record, page 376.]
3.

The

Strongs

thereafter

Corporation, ("FCA") for a loan.
parent American.

approached

FCA

Mortgage

FCA was acting on behalf of its

The loan from American was to be for $81,400.00

with interest at 12.75% per annum and was to be secured by a first
trust deed on the property.
4.

Guardian Title Company of Utah ("Guardian") is a Utah

Corporation, doing

business

authorized title agent.
5.

[Record, page 376.]

in Utah

as a duly qualified

and

[Record, page 376.]

Guardian represented USLife Title Insurance Company of

Dallas, aka Title USA Insurance Company, ("USLife")

as its agent.

Guardian and USLife had executed a CONTRACT OF AGENCY, a copy of
which contract is included within the addendum hereto as Exhibit
"J".

This contract provided that Guardian had the authority to do

the following:
4

a.

to issue title insurance commitments

and title

insurance policies up to a $300,000.00 policy limit on behalf of
USLife (Section I ) ;
b.

to examine the title of the property insured to

determine any and all express exceptions and exclusions from the
policy such as the Scenic Rail trust deed (Section II);
c.

to correctly reflect the condition of the title on

the title insurance commitments and title policies (Section III);
d.

to collect premiums and pay USLife its share of 20%

as an "underwriting risk" premium (Sections IV & V ) ; and
e.
which

the

to properly and regularly close the transaction on

commitment

or

policy

was

predicated

(Section V ) .

[Record, page 37 7.]
6.

Guardian and USLife were selected to examine the state of

the title on the property, to close the loan between the Strongs
and

American,

possession
disburse

of

act

as

$81,400.00

the

instructions

to

proceeds

escrow
in

and

loan

proceeds

according

from American, and

closing

to

to

from

written

issue

agent,

to

take

American,

to

escrow/closing

a title

policy

for

$81,400.00 insuring American's trust deed in first position against
the

property.

The

closing

was

held

and

Guardian

recorded

American's trust deed on March 14, 1984 in the records of the Salt
Lake

County Recorder's

office.

On or about March

23, 1984,

Guardian and USLife issued a title policy insuring American's trust
deed in first position, a copy of said policy is included within
the addendum to Guardian's brief

[Record, page 37 7.]
5

7.

The closing, escrow and disbursal of loan proceeds were

governed by written escrow instructions from American to Guardian
and USLife that the policy was to insure the American trust deed
as a "first and paramount lien of record" and that Guardian was to
"pay off any and all liens on the subject property" ahead of
American's

trust

deed.

The

instructions

were

received

and

acknowledged in writing by Guardian's escrow/closing officer, Ms.
Fay Anderson.
8.

[Record, page 378.]

During the title search of the property

and prior to

closing, Guardian became aware of the Scenic Rail loan and trust
deed, and that, even though it was entitled "Second Trust Deed",
it was

superior to the trust deed of American

recorded at closing.

that would be

[Record, page 37 9; Anderson deposition pp 45

& 46; Killpack deposition p. 22.]
9.

Notwithstanding the clear escrow/closing instructions of

American, Guardian and USLife closed the American loan even though
the Scenic Rail trust deed remained of record and superior in
priority to American's trust deed. Guardian's closing officer, Ms.
Anderson knew that the Scenic Rail trust deed needed to be paid off
from American's loan proceeds, but failed to do so.

Thereafter,

the title policy showing American in a first priority position,
without any mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed, was issued by
Guardian and USLife on or about March 23, 1984.

However, prior

to signing the policy, Ms. Anderson became aware that the loan
proceeds from American, that should have been used to pay off
Scenic

Rail, were mistakenly

disbursed
6

by her

office

to

the

Strongs.

The Scenic Rail trust deed had not been paid off.

Ms

Anderson advised her superiors, including Ms. Killpack, Guardian's
Vice

President

and

Office

Manager,

Guardian's President and Owner.

and

Mr.

Warren

Curlis,

These individuals, as employees

of Guardian, and as agent of USLife, consciously chose to issue and
sign the title policy showing American in first position.

They did

so clearly aware of their liability to American and the fact that
the

representation

in the

policy

that American

position was a false representation.

was

in

first

The policy was signed and

sent to American in Stockton, California showing its Trust Deed in
a first position and not mentioning in any manner whatsoever the
Scenic Rail trust deed.

[Record, page 379; Anderson deposition pp

51-54 and Exhibit 8 of said deposition.]
10.

American was under the belief that the loan was closed

as it had instructed, i.e., that its trust deed was in a first
priority position.

USLife, its agent Guardian, and Guardian's

officers and employees, chose not to advise American that its trust
deed was in second priority behind Scenic Rail for they realized
Guardian and USLife were liable to American under the policy.
[Record, page 350; Anderson deposition pp 53, 62 & 63; Killpack
deposition pp 30-32.]
11.

Guardian and USLife then contacted the Strongs to push

their payment of the Scenic Rail trust deed, and contacted Scenic
Rail

to

obtain

a

subordination

agreement.

The

Strongs

told

Guardian that they could not immediately pay off the Scenic Rail
trust deed because the windfall they had mistakenly received at
7

closing had been put into "investments"•

Scenic Rail refused to

sign a subordination agreement because the property was not worth
enough to secure both the American loan and its loan.

These

conversations took place for approximately one to two months after
the closing, i.e., April and May of 1984.

[Record, page 350;

Anderson deposition pp 54-61; Killpack deposition pp 24-28.]
12.

After this initial effort, no further attempt was made

by Guardian or USLife to resolve the problem or to notify American
of

the

problem.

No

one

at

Guardian

felt

it

was

their

responsibility to obtain release of the Scenic Rail trust deed.
Nor was there any attempt to monitor the Strong's timely payment
of the monthly installments under the Scenic Rail note and trust
deed.

(Record, page 381; Anderson deposition pp 61-63; Killpack

deposition pp 24-31.]
13.

Notwithstanding the fact that Guardian and USLife knew

that they could have recorded a REQUEST FOR NOTICE pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §57-1-26, requesting notice of any foreclosure proceeding
by Scenic Rail, they failed to do so.

Instead, Guardian and USLife

concluded that if Scenic Rail foreclosed, they would rely upon
American to contact them and advise them of the foreclosure.

Yet,

Guardian and USLife refused to notify American of the Scenic Rail
trust deed

so that American would

foreclosure

was

a

possibility.

have an

[Record,

idea
page

that

such a

381; Killpack

deposition pp 28-31.]
14.

On February 1, 1986, the Strongs defaulted on their loan

with American.

At that time, the balance due to American was

8

$80,939.35 principal, together with accrued interest and a reserve
fund shortage of $1,712.16.
15.

On August

8,

[Record, page 382.]

1986, the

Strongs

filed

a Chapter 7

Bankruptcy petition and obtained a full discharge of their debts
without payment of dividends to any unsecured
American.
16.

creditors or to

[Record, page 382.]
Shortly after the default of the Strongs on American's

loan, American commenced foreclosure against the property.
foreclosure was stayed by the Strong's bankruptcy.

The

In conjunction

with the foreclosure, American's Trustee, Mr. Lester A. Perry, then
of Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, obtained a foreclosure report
from another title company listing the Scenic Rail trust deed as
a "Second Trust Deed".

A closer review of the foreclosure report

would have revealed that the recording date of the Scenic Rail
trust deed was prior to the recording date of American's Trust
Deed.

However, this fact was not noticed because the trust deed

was listed as a "Second Trust Deed" and an inspection of the USLife
title policy indicated that American's Trust Deed was in a first
position with no mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed.

It was

believed that the Scenic Rail trust deed was in fact a second trust
deed.

[Record, page 382.]
17.

The Strongs also defaulted on their loan with Scenic Rail

and foreclosure was commenced on this trust deed by recording a
notice of default on October 20, 1986. The Strongs bankruptcy also
delayed completion of the Scenic Rail foreclosure.

A notice of

default and notice of sale were prepared and recorded by Scenic
9

Rail's Trustee and the property was sold at Trustees sale for
$30,000.00

on

February

("United Bond").
18.

3,

1987

Bond

Finance Corp.

[Record, page 383.]

American received copies of the Scenic Rail notice of

default and notice of sale.
checked

to United

the

title

policy

The office of American's Trustee

issued

by

Guardian

and

USLife

and

determined that American's Trust Deed was in first position. Thus,
the Trustee and American believed that a second trust deed or
junior trust deed was foreclosing and American's trust deed was not
in jeopardy.
19.

[Record, page 383.]

During American's foreclosure, American was notified by

a third party title company that its interest had been foreclosed
out by Scenic Rail.
USLife

by

letter

American immediately notified Guardian and
dated

March

9,

1987, of

the

Scenic

Rail

foreclosure and demanded payment of the full amount of the title
policy plus interest because of the complete failure of American's
trust deed.
20.

[Record, page 384].

Guardian and USLife refused to pay any sums to American.

After this lawsuit was commenced, USLife offered a judgment for
$27,131.19.

However, acceptance of this judgment was conditioned

upon settlement in full by American.

Approximately one (1) year

after this lawsuit was filed, Guardian and USLife paid American
$29,957.30 without condition.
21.

[Record, page 384.]

Shortly after March 9, 1987, Mr. L. Benson Mabey, a Utah

attorney, called American's counsel to discuss the claim made by
American. Mr. Mabey indicated that he felt it would be prudent for
10

him as counsel for American, to file a state court action to set
aside the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and to file an objection in
the Strong's bankruptcy to reopen the bankruptcy and object to the
discharge

of American's

debt.

During

the

course

of

several

conversations between March 9, 1987 and March 18, 1987, Mr. Mabey
and American's Trustee, Mr. Perry, fully discussed the facts that
were then unfolding.
theories of recovery.

They also considered

strategy and legal

These discussions were held because of the

express representation of Mr. Mabey that he was the title company's
attorney hired to represent American.

Mr. Mabey filed the state

court action and the motion to reopen the Strong's bankruptcy
purporting to represent American.

Mr. Mabey confirmed his legal

representation of American as its attorney by letter of March 13,
1987 to Ms. Leila Brand, an employee and officer of American.

A

copy of said letter is included in the addendum hereto as Exhibit
"G".

[Record, page 384.]
22.

On April 17, 1987, Mr. John T. Anderson sent a letter to

Ms. Brand, a copy of which is included in the addendum hereto as
Exhibit "H", indicating that he represented the title insurer and
that Mr. Mabey was not authorized to represent American.

This

letter was one month after full and open discussions between Mr.
Perry and Mr. Mabey concerning the facts and legal strategy of
American.

Mr. Anderson, thereafter, required Mr. Mabey to dismiss

the state court action and cease any and all representation of
American in either the state court or bankruptcy actions.
page 385.]
11

[Record,

23.

On July 6, 1987 Mr. Anderson sent a letter to Mr. Perry's

law firm denying
policy.

coverage of American's

trust deed under the

This denial was expressly based upon the discussions held

between Mr. Mabey and Mr. Perry while Mr. Mabey purported to
represent American.

A copy of Mr. Anderson's letter is contained

within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "I".

American filed the

present law suit and Mr. Mabey and Mr. Anderson appeared as counsel
for the defendants, Guardian and USLife.
24.

[Record, page 385.]

The amount due to American under the Strong loan on

February 1, 19 86, the date the Strongs defaulted under their loan,
was $82,651.51 including interest, late fees, and reserve shortage.
The amount due to American on the date that Scenic Rail completed
its

foreclosure, February

23, 1987, was

interest, late fees and reserve shortage.

$95,380.15, including
[Record, page 386.]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Guardian

argues

that American

is

limited

theories of recovery under the title policy.

to

contractual

Guardian further

argues that as such, it is not liable for its actions.
American's

However,

claims are not limited to contractual theories and

Guardian is responsible for its actions that breached express and
implied contractual duties and tort duties.
Guardian argues that as a contract of indemnity, the title
policy was not breached.

However, the title was breached even if

it was construed as a contract of indemnity.

In addition, the

title policy is a contract of warranty and was clearly breached by
the actions of Guardian and USLife.
12

Guardian ignores the fact that its actions and the actions of
USLife are undisputed and constitute prima facia causes of action
for breach of various noncontract duties based in tort, fraud, and
various statutory duties.
Damages should be measured from the date the loan was closed
which is the date all contract and tort duties were breached, which
damages are the amount due under the loan made by American plus
interest, less any payments towards the loan.

American could not

mitigate its damages and owed Guardian and USLife no duty to notify
them of the Scenic Rail trust deed under the circumstances.
The trial court errored in not awarding reasonable attorneys fees
and in not finding Guardian and USLife liable for punitive damages
reserving the factual issue of their financial condition and the
amount of punitive damages for further evidentiary hearings.
This court should affirm the judgement of the trial court as
to compensatory damages and reverse the trial court's decision as
to attorneys fees and punitive damages remanding this action for
a factual determination of the proper amount of attorney's fees and
punitive damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CLAIMS OF AMERICAN AGAINST GUARDIAN AND
USLIFE ARE NOT LIMITED TO CONTRACTUAL THEORIES
OF RECOVERY BASED UPON THE TITLE POLICY, AND
GUARDIAN
IS LIABLE
FOR
ITS BREACH
OF
CONTRACTUAL AND TORT DUTIES OWED TO AMERICAN.
Guardian argues that the claims of American must be limited
to contractual theories of recovery found within the title policy.
13

All other theories outside of the contract must fail, whether
sounding in tort, fraud, implied contract, etc. Guardian goes on
to argue that since American's claims are limited to the title
policy,

Guardian, as

the

agent, has

no

duty

to

perform

the

obligations of its principle, USLife, under the title policy.
[Point I and Point II of Guardian's argument.]
A,
BECK V, FARMER'S INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 701
P. 2d 795 (Utah 1985) DOES NOT LIMIT AMERICAN'S
CLAIMS TO BREACH OF CONTRACT UNDER THE TITLE
POLICY.
Guardian relies upon the case of Beck v. Farmer's Insurance
Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795 (Utah 1985) for the proposition that a first
party relationship between an insurer and an insured is contractual
rather than fiduciary.

Thus, Guardian concludes that any claim by

the insured must only be based upon the contract of insurance.
Beck simply does not limit the insured's claims to breach of
contract theories under the insurance policy.

The recent case of

Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 4,
No.

880388

(Utah

1990) sites

footnote

three of Beck

for the

proposition that:
We [the Justices of the Supreme Court for the
State of Utah] recognize that in some cases
the acts constituting a breach of contract may
also result in breaches of duty that are
independent of the contract and may give rise
to causes of action in tort.
Culp

Construction

Company v. Buildmart Mall, at

6,

citations

omitted.
The Culp case is particularly germane to the issues presented
by Guardian because of the similarity of its facts to the case
14

presented in this appeal.

In

CUJJD,

Tower Federal Savings and Loan

Association was issued a lender's policy by Richmond Title Co. as
agent, and Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp,, as insurer.

The policy

was issued pursuant to escrow instructions that required the Tower
trust deed to be "in a second lien position behind [First Security
Bank]" before the loan proceeds were disbursed.

The loan was

closed and Tower, unfortunately, found itself behind many mechanics
liens in addition to First Security Bank's trust deed.
the

insurer and

its agent under contractual

Tower sued

theories

and

for

negligent misrepresentation.
The Utah Supreme Court considered the issue of whether Beck
limited the insured's action against the title insurer and its
agent to the contract of insurance.

The Court held that Beck did

not so limit the insured's claims, and specifically reinstated the
claim for negligent misrepresentation.

In dicta, the Court also

suggested that the title agent may have assumed the duties of an
abstractor by researching the property's title and issuing an
incorrect and false title commitment and subsequent policy in the
face of very specific escrow instructions.
Beck and Culp, clearly allow American's claims based on tort
and implied contract theories outside the title policy.
B.
GUARDIAN CANNOT CLAIM THE BENEFIT OF ANY
LIMITATION OF REMEDIES TO BREACH OF CONTRACT
THEORIES UNDER THE TITLE POLICY.
In another critical step in Guardian's argument, it claims
the benefit of paragraph 11 of the title policy which states:
11.

LIABILITY LIMITED TO THIS POLICY
15

This instrument together with all endorsements
and other instruments, if any, attached hereto
by the Company is the entire policy and
contract between the insured and the Company,
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not
based on negligence, and which arises out of
the status of the lien of the insured mortgage
or of the title to the estate or interest
covered hereby or any action asserting such
claim shall be restricted to the provisions
and conditions and stipulations of this
policy, [Emphasis added,]
However, the title policy defines "the Company" as USLife,
not Guardian. Further, in its argument, Guardian maintains that it
is not a party to the title policy.

Thus, no protection is

afforded Guardian by this contractual language.
C.
THE LIMITATION IN THE TITLE POLICY TO
ONLY CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY IS NOT
ENFORCEABLE AND DOES NOT LIMIT AMERICAN'S
REMEDIES TO BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORIES.
The courts have not supported exculpatory language similar to
paragraph 11 of the policy.

Seeking to protect the insured, courts

have generally construed exculpatory language against the insurer.
A title insurer is engaged in a business "effected with the public
interest and cannot by an adhesion contract, exculpate itself from
liability for negligence."

White v. Western Title Insurance Co.,

40 Cal. 3rd 882, at 884, citing Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264
Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968); cf. L. Smirlock Realty
Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co., 437 N.Y.S.2d. 57, 52 N.Y.2d 182 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1981).
Finally, in the Culp case, the Utah Supreme Court remanded
the action for trial on several issues, including whether the title
agent and

insurer were

liable for the non-contract
16

theory of

negligent misrepresentation.

This was done even though the Culp

title policy contained a provision which was verbatim to Paragraph
11 of the USLife title policy in the present case (the Culp title
policy is Exhibit E to appellant's brief Culp Construction v.
Buildmart Ma111.
D.
THE LIMITATION IN THE TITLE POLICY TO
ONLY CONTRACT THEORIES OF RECOVERY DOES NOT
PROHIBIT
ACTIONS
BASED
UPON
BREACH
OF
STATUTORY DUTIES.
USLife

and

Guardian

breached

several

statutory

duties.

Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308 provides:
Any title company, represented by one or more
title insurance agents, is directly and
primarily liable to others dealing with the
title insurance agents for the receipt and
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows,
closings, or settlements with the title
insurance agents in all those transactions
where a commitment or binder for a policy or
contract of title insurance of that title
insurance company has been ordered, or a
preliminary report of the title insurance
company has been issued or distributed. This
liability does not modify, mitigate, impair,
or affect the contractual obligations between
the title insurance agents and the title
insurance company. [Emphasis added]
USLife and Guardian were directly and primarily liable for
the receipt and disbursement of the funds deposited in escrow by
American and misapplied by Guardian contrary to the explicit escrow
instructions of American.
Guardian

was

licensed

under

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

31A-23-

201(1)(1985) . As such, Guardian was bound to the duties owed the
public under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-302(1985) which reads in
pertinent part:
17

(1) (a) (i)
No person who is or should be
licensed under this title, no employee or
agent of that licensee or person who should be
licensed, no person whose primary interest is
as a competitor of a person licensed under
this title, and no person on behalf of any of
these persons may make or cause to be made any
communication
which
contains
false
or
misleading
information,
relating
to
an
insurance contract, any insurer, or other
licensee
under
this
title,
including
information which is false or misleading
because it is incomplete.

(b) If an insurance agent or third party
administrator distributes cards or documents,
exhibits a sign, or publishes an advertisement
that
violates
Subsection
d(l)(a),
with
reference to a particular insurer that the
agent represents, or for whom the third party
administrator processes claims and if the
cards, documents, signs, or advertisements are
supplied or approved by that insurer, the
agent's or the third party administrator's
violation creates a rebuttable presumption
that the violation was also committed by the
insurer. [Emphasis added.]
Guardian

intentionally

issued

a title policy with false,

misleading and incomplete information to American by intentionally
deleting any reference to the Scenic Rail trust deed when Guardian
knew

the

trust

deed

existed,

it

was

senior

in

priority

to

American's trust deed, and American had required all liens such as
the Scenic Rail trust deed to be paid off before the loan proceeds
were disbursed.
violated

this

A rebuttable presumption that U.S. Life also
statute

arose

under

Utah

Code

302(1)(b), which presumption was never rebutted.
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Ann.

§ 31A-23-

Finally, U.S. Life and Guardian breached the statutory duty
within Utah Code Ann. § 31A-20-110(1).

Guardian's argument that

Paragraph 11 of the title policy limits all legal action to a
contract action under the policy would also nullify this statutory
duty and any remedy thereunder.
E.
GUARDIAN IS LIABLE FOR ITS OWN ACTION
THAT BREACHED CONTRACTUAL AND TORT DUTIES OWED
TO AMERICAN.
Guardian argues that since it was merely an agent for USLife
and since all duties owed by Guardian and USLife to American merged
into the title policy, only USLife could be found liable for breach
of the title policy.
Guardian
Restatement

cites

of

the

3

Am.Jur.

Law,

2nd,

Agency

Agency,

2nd,

§

§

320, to

302

and

the

support

its

proposition that Guardian, as an agent acting for a disclosed
principal,

cannot

be

liable

for

failing

to

follow

the

escrow/closing instructions and issuing a false title policy with
the

complete

loss

of

American's

trust

deed

caused

by

the

intentionally deleted Scenic Rail trust deed.
Fortunately, such is not the state of our common law.

Section

302 of 3 Am.Jur. 2nd, Agency, and Section 320 of the Restatement
of the Law, Agency 2nd, limits liability for breach of contract by
the principal where the agent acts "lawfully" (not in breach of any
duties

owed

authority.

to

third

parties)

and

within

the

scope

of

his

This section does not limit liability where the agent

commits a fraud or tort against a third party, or where the agent
breaches a contract on his own behalf.
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In these latter cases, the

agent is liable for his actions.

Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P2d

696, 699 (Utah 1985); Mecham v. Benson , 590 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah
1979); 3 Am.Jur.2nd, Agency, § 309; and Restatement of the Law,
Agency 2nd, § 343.
Finally, Guardian admits to certain tort and contract duties
owed to American in the following statement located at the bottom
of page ten of its brief:
An insurance agent does, however, have a duty
to procure the insurance policy on the terms
and conditions directed by the client, and if
he fails to do so, he would become liable for
damages suffered from lack of insurance.
This duty is one of the duties fully explained within 3 Couch
on Insurance Second, §§ 25:32 - 25:46, these duties being the duty
to obey instructions

(such as American's escrow instructions to

Guardian), the duty to use reasonable skill and care

(such as

Guardian's duty to make sure American's trust deed was in a first
position),

and

the

duty

not

to

mislead

the

insured

(by

intentionally issuing a false title policy).
Guardian is simply responsible for its own acts that breached
contractual or tort duties.

The law does not allow Guardian to

hide behind the claim that it was acting on behalf of a disclosed
principal.
POINT II
THE PROVISIONS OF THE TITLE POLICY WERE
BREACHED BY USLIFE AND GUARDIAN AND THEY ARE
LIABLE TO AMERICAN UNDER BREACH OF CONTRACT
THEORIES.
At Point III of its Argument, Guardian proposes that its title
policy is a contract of indemnity, not a contract of warranty or
20

guarantee.

Guardian cites the Idaho case of Brown's Tie & Lumber

v. Chicago Title Company, 764 P.2d 423, 429 (Idaho 1988) for this
proposition.

Based upon this premise, Guardian goes on to argue

that as a contract of indemnity, the policy would be breached only
if American incurred damage by virtue of its mortgage not being in
first position and USLife refused to indemnify American for the
damage.

Guardian argues that USLife tendered the $29,957.30 which

would have been necessary to pay off Scenic Rail at its foreclosure
sale.

Thus, Guardian concludes that according to Securities'

Service, Inc. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 583 P. 2d
1217,

1223

(Wash.

App.

1978),

USLife

fully

performed

all

obligations owed to American under the title policy.
A.
THE TITLE POLICY WAS A CONTRACT OF
WARRANTY WHICH WAS BREACHED BY USLIFE AND
GUARDIAN.
Guardian's argument is incorrect in several respects as to
the law and as to the facts.
law, not Utah law.

First, the Brown's Tie case is Idaho

The Utah Supreme Court in Bush v. Coult, 594

P. 2d 865, 867 (Utah 1979) was faced with interpreting a lender's
title

policy

Lockhart's

insuring

a trust

trust deed had

deed

of

the

Lockhart

Company.

failed because the interest of its

trustor was based upon a forged deed.

The title insurer defended

against Lockhart's claim by arguing that Lockhart failed to inform
it that another title insurer had previously declined to insure
Lockhart's trust deed because of questions concerning the integrity
of

a

Mr.

Jerome

Yeck.

Mr. Yeck

21

was

the

principal

in

the

development

company

that

sought

to develop

the property

with

Lockhart's borrower/trustor.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Lockhart
had a legal obligation to convey this information to the title
insurer by quoting Empire Development Company v. Title Guarantee
and Trust Company, 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918) as follows:
[t]o a layman a [title] search is a
mystery, and the various pitfalls that may
beset his title are dreaded, but unknown
To avoid a possible claim against him to
obviate the need and expense of professional
advice, and the uncertainty that sometimes
results even after it has been obtained, is
the very purpose for which the owner seeks
insurance. . .
A title policy is much in the nature of a
covenant of warranty or a covenant against
encumbrances ." [ Emphasis added. ] l
x

The importance of the distinction between a contract of
indemnity and a contract of warranty is demonstrated in the case
of Summonte v. First American Title Insurance Co., 180 N.J. Super.
605, 436 A. 2d 110 (1981). In the Summonte case, the insurer was
arguing that as a contract of indemnity, no damage was incurred by
the insured until the default of the undisclosed encumbrance cause
the insured to pay money to protect his property interest. The
court reviewed a history of the cases where a title insurance
policy was interpreted to be a contract of warranty. These cases
included the Empire Development Company case adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court in Bush. The New Jersey Superior Court agreed with
the statement in Empire Development Company that "to say that when
a defect subsequently develops he [the insured] has lost nothing
and, therefore, can recover nothing, is to misinterpret the
intention of both the insured and the insurer." Empire Development
Company v. Title Guarantee and Trust Company, at p. 47 0. The New
Jersey Court concluded that "any concept of fair dealing requires
the [title] company to remove the title defect without insisting
upon an "actual loss" as it defines that unworkable term" Summonte
v. First American Title Insurance Co., at p. 116.; CF. Jarchow v.
Transamerican Title Insurance Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 470 (D.Ct. App. 1975), wherein the California Court of appeal
held "we hold that when a title company insures a buyer of real
property against liens and negligently fails to discover or
disclose a recorded lien or encumbrance or fails to exclude a known
22

The Utah Supreme Court has since upheld the Bush case and its
interpretation of a title policy as a contract or covenant of
warranty against encumbrances.

In the recent case of Zion's First

National Bank, N.A. vs. National American Title Insurance Company,
749 P. 2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court again interpreted
a lender's title policy as a contract of warranty and that the
insured was under no obligation

to perform

the duty of

the

insurance company, i.e. determine the validity and state of the
insured's title.2
In the case of Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P. 2d 598, 604 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court defined a contract of warranty as
follows:
A warranty is an assurance by on party to a
contract of the existence of a fact upon which
the other party may rely. It is intended to
relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain
the fact for himself, and it amounts to a
promise to answer in damages for any injury
proximately caused if the fact warrantied
proves untrue.

recorded lien or encumbrance from coverage and, upon being notified
of the existence of a recorded lien or encumbrance, unjustifiably
refuses to take any legal action to clear the title or eliminate
the cloud, the insurer may be liable to the insured..." 48 Cal.
App. 3d at p. 926, 122 Cal. Rptr. at p. 476.
2

There is one case in Utah that has held a lender's title
policy to be a contract of indemnity. Valley Bank & Trust Company
v. USLife Title Insurance Company of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 935
(Utah App. 1989) . This case is contrary to the Bush and Zion' s the
title policy as a ocntract of indemnity in the Valley Bank case may
have been unnecessary to resolve the issues of that case. This
Court should reconsider its designation of a lender's title policy
as a contract of indemnity and consider such an insurance policy
as a contract of warranty consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's
interpretation of such a contract.
23

Citations omitted.
In Groen, the Supreme Court continued:
Unlike liability for negligence, which is
based on fault, breach of warranty sounds in
strict liability. Breach of warranty does not
require
that
the
person
making
the
representation or promise be aware that it is
false . . .
Citations omitted.
As a contract of warranty, the USLife Title policy warrantied
or assured American that American's trust deed was a "first and
paramount lien of record" and that Guardian and USLife had paid
"off any and all liens on the subject property" ahead of American's
trust deed as expressly required in American's
instructions.

escrow/closing

Yet, USLife and Guardian issued the policy with

constructive and actual knowledge of the Scenic Rail trust deed
and the fact that it was senior to American's trust deed.

This

action was an immediate breach of five of the eight warranties set
forth within the first page of the title policy.3

3

POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE issued by USLIFE Title Insurance
Company of Dallas, SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. THE
EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company
of Dallas, a Texas corporation, herein called the Company, insures
as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage
not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, against
loss or damage costs, attorneys fees and expenses which the compnay
may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the
insured by reason of:
1.
Title to the estate or interest described in
Schedule A being vested otherwise than as
stated therein:
2.
Any defect in or lien or encumbrane on such
title:
.

4.

.

.

Unmarketability of such title:
24

American had the right to bring an action on the date of the
breach of these warranties, i.e., the date the policy was issued,
and American would have filed such an action if the true state of
the title had not been concealed by Guardian and USLife.

Indeed,

such an action would have been consistent with the doctrine of
"reasonable expectations", which provides that American had the
right to expect the title for which it had purchased insurance.4
B. THE TITLE POLICY WAS CONTRACTUALLY BREACHED EVEN IF
THE POLICY IS INTERPRETED TO BE A CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY.
USLife breached the promises made within paragraphs 1, 2, 3,
5 and 6 of the first page of the policy set forth within footnote
3, above.

American's trust deed was lost by foreclosure of the

Scenic Rail Trust Deed, a defect or encumbrance known to Guardian
at the time the policy was issued.

Since this trust deed was known

to Guardian, USLife is considered to have also known of the Scenic
Rail trust deed at the time the policy was issued.

Hardy v.

Prudential Insurance Company of America, 763 P.2d 761, 767 (Utah
1988) .

5.
6•

The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of
the insured mortgage upon siad estate or interest. . .
The priority of any lien or curcumference over the
lien of the insured mortgage;

4

USLife Title Ins. Co. of Dallas v. Hutsell, 296 S.E.2d 760
(Ga. App. 1982); Dinqes v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 435 N.E.2d 944
(111. App. 1982); Dixon v. Shirley, 558 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1977);
Laabs v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 72 Wis.2d 503, 241 N.W.2d (1976);
Jarchow v. Transamerican Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 1917, 122
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975); Pruett v. Mississippi Valley Title Insurance
Co., 271 So.2d 920 (Miss 1973); Summonte v. First American Title
Ins. Co., supra. at p. 112.
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American's entire security interest which totalled $82,651.51
as of the date the Strong's defaulted under their loan had failed.
The collateral was the only likely source of payment on American's
loan.

The Strongs had filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a

discharge of their debts.

No distribution was paid to unsecured

creditors from their bankruptcy estate.
Notwithstanding these facts, USLife refused to pay any money
whatsoever towards American's claim.

American was forced to file

suit and prosecute this action for nearly one year before USLife
tendered the $29,957.30 that Guardian now proudly asserts was full
and complete performance under the title policy.

However, this

payment did not make American whole for the loss of its entire
$82,000 security interest, which loss was caused by the Scenic Rail
trust deed which was actually known to exist by Guardian and USLife
and which was intentionally hidden from American.
C. THE TENDER BY USLIFE OF $29,957.30 WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT
TO
FULFILL
THE
CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS OF USLIFE UNDER THE TITLE POLICY.
As set forth above, Guardian cites the Securities' Service
case

for the proposition

that

" [ojrdinarily, when the defect

insured against takes the form of a lien or encumbrance, the
owner's loss is measured by the amount of money required to remove
the offending lien or encumbrance."

Citations omitted.

However,

Judge Moffat, the trial judge herein, cites the Securities' Service
case to support his theory of breach "where at the time the policy
was delivered, the title was defective by reason of a lien or
encumbrance,

the

contract

was

breached
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and

the

company

was

immediately liable to the insured for the loss actually suffered-"
Minute Entry of Judge Richard H. Moffat, April 19, 1989, page two.
(Included within the addendum to brief of Guardian.)
The

Securities'

Service

case

actually

stands

for

the

proposition that ordinarily an owner's loss under an owner's title
policy caused by a senior trust deed that was not an exception to
the policy, is usually measured by the amount of money paid to the
lienholder to remove the lien or encumbrance.

However, where the

actual loss to the owner is different from the amount that would
have been required by the lienholder to clear off the offending
lien, the actual loss is the amount of damage.

In the Securities'

Service case, this actual loss was, in fact, less than the amount
of the lien since the total monies paid by the owner for the
property was

less than the amount due on the offending lien.

However, in the case at bar, the amount of the actual loss was much
more

than

the

$29,957.30

due

to

Scenic

foreclosed out American's mortgage.

Rail

on the date

it

American's entire security

interest had failed because of the shenanigans of Guardian Title.
The entire security interest was the actual loss of American and
totalled over $82,000.

POINT III
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW A BREACH OF
TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT DUTIES OWED TO
AMERICAN BY GUARDIAN AND USLIFE.
American

sued

Guardian

and

USLife

and

based

its

summary

judgement upon breach of the warranties within the title policy,
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breach of the duty to establish the title of American as insured,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the
duty to correctly perform American's escrow/closing instructions,
breach

of

the

duty

to

correctly

abstract

the

title,

fraud,

negligent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel, breach of public
policy considerations because of the postclaim actions of the
attorneys for the title companies, and violation of the unfair
marketing practices statute (Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-302).
Only the first three theories of liability are founded upon
breach of contractual duties within the title policy.
support

liability

under

any

and

Yet, the

undisputed

facts

all

of

the

theories.

Guardian does not address liability under the non-

contract theories, choosing to argue that American is limited to
only the contract theories.

As demonstrated above in Point I of

the Argument, American is not so limited, and Guardian has not
sought to appeal the propriety of any judgement based upon the
non-contract theories,
A. GUARDIAN AND U.S.LIFE BREACHED THEIR DUTY
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS OF
AMERICAN.
The escrow instructions were clear and unequivocal.

They

stated that the title policy to be issued by Guardian and U.S.Life
was to insure the American trust deed as a "first and paramount
lien of record" and that Guardian was to "pay off any and all liens
on the subject property" ahead of American's trust deed.

Guardian

admittedly received these instructions and was operating under
their clear direction.
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As escrow/closing agents, Guardian and USLife were under a
duty

to

strictly

comply with

the

instructions.

Banville

v.

Schmidt, 37 Cal, App.3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974); Amen v.
Merced County Title Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 65, 375 P.2d 33 (1962);
Malta v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 76 Ariz. 116, 554 P. 2d 259
(1953).

Their failure to do so constituted breach of an implied

contract with American.
Guardian

and

USLife

were

also

considered

fiduciaries

to

American and owed American the duty to perform their instructed
assignment

with

scrupulous

honesty,

skill

and

diligence.

Buffington v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 26 Ariz. App. 97, 546 P.2d
366 (1976); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract and Title, 220 Kan. 244, 533
P. 2d

254

(1076); Amen, supra; and Moe v. Transamerican

Title

Insurance Company, 21 Cal. App.3d 289, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1971).
The failure of Guardian and U.S.Life to do so exposed Guardian and
USLife to tort liability.
Regardless of whether the duty owed by Guardian and USLife to
American is characterized as contract or fiduciary, theire is no
question that their actions breached either type of duty.

Guardian

and USLife knew of the Scenic Rail trust deed prior to closing
American's loan,, After the closing, Guardian and USLife discovered
that they had mistakenly paid the Strongs instead of Scenic Rail.
American's

trust deed was not a

"first and paramount

lien of

record" and Guardian had not "paid off any and all liens on the
subject property" ahead of American.

Rather than inform American

of the mistake, Guardian chose to issue the title policy without
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any mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed.

Guardian further

concealed these facts from American for three years.
USLife is responsible and liable for the actions of Guardian
as an escrow/closing agent under Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308 (1985).
(This code section is contained within the addendum hereto.)
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §31A-20-110 (1) imposed underwriting
standards on Guardian and USLife, as follows:
No title insurance policy may be
insurer or its agent has conducted
examination of the title and has
insurability of title under sound
[Emphasis Added]

written until the title
a reasonable search and
made a determination of
underwriting principles.

The standard of a "reasonable search" was not met, but Guardian
chose to issue the policy notwithstanding.
B.
GUARDIAN BREACHED
ABSTRACTOR OF TITLE.

ITS

DUTY

AS

AN

The Utah Supreme Court held in the Culp case that a title
insurer generally does not accept the duty to properly abstract
title by issuing title insurance.

However, the court recognized

that explicit escrow instructions to a title agent that loan
proceeds not be disbursed until the state of the title is as
instructed by the insured lender, will give rise to a cause of
action for abstractor liability against the title agent.

Culp

Construction Company vs Buildmart Mall, at p.7.
C.
GUARDIAN AND U.S. LIFE ARE LIABLE FOR
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.
Under the case of Christiansen v. Commonwealth Land Title
Insurance Co. 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983), a title insurance
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agent

performing

escrow/closing

functions

was

held

to

have

committed the tort of negligent misrepresentation as to a third
party relying upon a written statement of the real property that
remained under an escrow agreement.

The Utah Supreme Court held

that the elements of a cause of action for the tort of negligent
misrepresentation were:
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction (2)
is in a superior position to know material facts, and (3)
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation
concerning them (4) expecting the other party to rely and act
thereon, and (5) and the other party reasonably does so and
(6) suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can be
held responsible if the other elements of fraud are also
present.
Christiansen v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., at P. 305.
Clearly Guardian and USLife had a pecuniary interest in the
transaction for they were paid an insurance premium.

Guardian was

also in a superior position to know of the material fact of the
Scenic Rail trust deed and in fact had actual knowledge of this
trust deed and its priority over American's trust deed.

Guardian

carelessly and negligently made a false statement in light of the
explicit

escrow/closing

instructions

of

American.

American

reasonably relied upon the omission of the Scenic Rail trust deed
in the title policy.

Finally, American suffered the loss of its

entire security interest at the hands of the omitted Scenic Rail
trust deed.
USLife is responsible for the torts of its agent, Guardian,
committed

in the performance of Guardian's

authorized duties.

Buckner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).
D.

GUARDIAN AND USLIFE COMMITTED A FRAUD UPON AMERICAN.
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In Utah, fraud is the making of a false representation
concerning a presently existing material fact which the representor
either knew to be false or made recklessly without sufficient
knowledge, or the omission of a material fact when there is a duty
to disclose, for the purpose for inducing action on the part of the
other party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage
to that party.
Guardian

5

and

establish a prima

USLife have admitted

the above

facts which

facie case for fraud and have generated no

evidence that infers anything but an uncontested finding of fraud.
E.
GUARDIAN AND USLIFE ARE ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING COVERAGE OF AMERICAN UNDER ITS TITLE
POLICY.
Guardian and USLife are estopped from denying coverage of
American's trust deed.

The elements of estoppel in Utah are one

person by his words, deeds, conduct or omissions leads another
person in good faith to rely upon such acts or omissions and the
person so relying has been intentionally lead thereby to change his
position and the person so relying would not have changed his
position except for the conduct of the other party.

If such facts

exist, the person so acting or committing such omission shall be

5

Conder v. A.L. Williams & A s s o c , Inc., 739 P. 2d 634 (Utah
1987); Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980); Pace v.
Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273; Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah
507, 184 P.2d 229.
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precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying or asserting
that the material fact or act does not exist.6
Given the actions of Guardian and USLife, no clearer case of
estoppel to deny liability under the title policy could possibly
be presented to this Court.
F. GUARDIAN AND U.S.LIFE HAVE WAIVED ANY AND
ALL DEFENSES UNDER THE TITLE POLICY BECAUSE OF
THE ACTIONS OF THEIR ATTORNEYS, AND AS A
MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY THEY ARE STRICTLY
LIABLE TO AMERICAN.
On or about March 9, 1987, American discovered that its trust
deed had been foreclosed by Scenic Rail.

American immediately

notified Guardian and USLife of this fact.

Mr. M. Lynn Mabey, a

Utah Attorney, called American's counsel, Mr. Lester A. Perry, and
discussed this situation.

Mr. Mabey represented that he felt that

it would be prudent for him, as counsel for American, to file a
state court action to set aside the Scenic Rail trustee's sale and
to file an action in the Strong's bankruptcy to object to the
discharge of American's debt.
During the course of several conversations between March 9,
1987 and March 18, 1987, Mr. Mabey and Mr. Perry fully discussed
the facts that were then unfolding.
and legal theories of recovery.

They also considered strategy

Mr. Perry held these discussions

only because Mr. Mabey expressly represented that he was the title
company's attorney hired to represent American.

6

Larson v Wycoff Co., 624 P. 2d 1151 (Utah 1981); Ravarino v
Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953); Mialiaccio v Davis, 232 P.2d 195
(Utah 1951) .
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Mr. Mabey confirmed his legal representation of American as
its attorney by letter of March 13, 1987 to Ms. Leila Brand, and
employee and officer of American.

(This letter is included within

the addendum hereto as Exhibit "G".)
On April 17, 1987, Mr. John T. Anderson sent a letter to Ms.
Brand indicating that he represented the title insurer and that Mr.
Mabey was not authorized to represent American.

(This letter is

included within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "H".)

This letter

was sent one month after full and complete discussions between Mr.
Mabey and Mr. Perry concerning the facts and legal strategies of
American.

Mr. Anderson, thereafter, required Mr. Mabey to dismiss

the state court action and cease any and all representation of
American in either the state court or bankruptcy actions.
On July 6, 1987, Mr. Anderson sent a letter to Mr. Perry's law
firm denying coverage of American under the policy.

Mr. Anderson

clearly based his denial upon the discussions between Mr. Mabey and
Mr. Anderson.

Mr. Anderson's letter stated that "Lester Perry

frankly acknowledged to Guardian's counsel, L. Benson Maybe, that
Mr. Perry was "concerned" and "alarmed" that his paralegal did not
discover

the

foregoing

facts,..."

(A copy

of

this

letter

is

contained within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "I".)
American then filed the present law suit.

Who should appear

as counsel for the defendant's Guardian and USLife?

Mr. Mabey and

Mr. Anderson.
Because of the actions of their attorneys, Guardian and USLife
are fully and strictly liable to American for all damages, not
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restricted by policy limits, and the defendants are estopped from
asserting any defenses whatsoever under the policy.

The courts

have held title companies to this penalty as a matter of public
policy to prevent this type of abuse by insurance companies.
Lake Havasu Community Hospital v. Arizona Title Ins. and Trust Co.,
141 Ariz 363, 687 P.2d 371 (1984).
G.
GUARDIAN AND USLIFE VIOLATED THE UNFAIR
MARKETING PRACTICES STATUTE OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-23-302.
Guardian and USLife owed a statutory duty to American to not
commit an unfair insurance marketing practice as defined by Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-23-302 (1985), a copy of which is included within
the addendum hereto as Exhibit "B".
section

by

issuing

the

title

Guardian violated this code

insurance

misleading and incomplete information.

policy

false,

USLife authorized Guardian

to act as its agent to search title records and
insurance on its behalf.

with

issue title

The rebuttable presumption of violation

of this statute by the insurer has been raised, but no facts exist
or have been presented

to rebut the presumption.

Thus, both

Guardian and USLife are statutorily liable for all damages caused
to American.
H. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE BREACHED THEIR IMPLIED
CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING OWED TO AMERICAN.
USLife and Guardian owed American a duty to act in good faith
and to deal fairly with American.
Exchange, at p. 801.

TI*

Beck vs Farmers

Insurance

failure of Guardian and USLife to act

fairly and in good faith exposed them to all foreseeable damages
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for breach of contract.
limits.

Such damages are not restricted to policy

Beck vs Farmers Insurance Exchanger at p.802.

Guardian and USLife breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by the following actions:
1.

Failing to follow the escrow/closing

American and then intentionally hiding
American

by

issuing

a

false

title

instructions of

such

failure

insurance

policy

from
and

covering up their actions to cure their mistake;
2.

By denying coverage and requiring American to sue and

prosecute this action for almost one year before tendering
payment of $29,957.30 to American on March 17, 1988, which
payment was admittedly owed by Guardian and USLife even under
their version of the facts and law;
3.

By the actions of the attorneys for Guardian and USLife,

where Guardian's counsel claimed to represent American, filed
two

legal

actions

on

behalf

of American,

held

strategy

conferences with American's representative based upon his
avowed representation of American, and then USLife denied
coverage

of

American

based

upon

the

discussions

and

information obtained from the strategy conferences.
Guardian and USLife have acted in bad faith from the outset
Their appeal, without any brief being filed on behalf of USLife,
is a culmination of this bad faith.
POINT IV
THE DAMAGES TO AMERICAN SHOULD BE
MEASURED FROM THE DATE THE POLICY
WAS ISSUED AND ARE EQUAL TO THE
AMOUNT OF THE MONEY LOANED BY
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AMERICAN, PLUS INTEREST LESS
PAYMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE.
In

Point

IV

of

its

ANY

argument, Guardian

claims

that

the

insurance policy did not insure that American would be paid7 on its
loan

or

that

the

American's debt.

collateral

would

be worth

enough

to

cover

Guardian does not dispute that the fair market

value of the collateral was sufficient to cover Americans debt when
the loan was made in March of 1984. Guardian, however, claims that
the fair market value of the collateral decreased between 1984 ajid
1987 when Americans trust deed was foreclosed by Scenic Rail.
Guardian asserts that American's damages must be limited to the
decreased value of the collateral and since this value was not
established or is disputed, summary judgement should not have been
granted to American on the issue of damages.

Basically, the issue

presented to this court by Guardian is whether damages be measured
by the amount of the loan or be limited to the fair market value
of the collateral and on what date should the collateral be valued,
i.e. who should bear the risk of decrease in the fair market value
of the collateral?
A. AMERICAN WOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED THE LOAN
TO CLOSE AND ITS MONEY DISBURSED IF AMERICAN
KNEW OF THE ACTIONS OF GUARDIAN AND USLIFE;
THUS, DAMAGES SHOULD BE MEASURED BY THE DATE
THE LOAN WAS CLOSED AND EQUAL THE AMOUNT DUE
ON THE LOAN.

7

There is no dispute that American would not have been paid on
its loan by any other source other than the subject collateral. The
borrowers have taken out bankruptcy, received a discharge, and no
bankruptcy dividend was paid to their unsecured creditors.
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The cases cited by Guardian state that the normal measure of
damages under a lender's title policy where a lender discovers an
undisclosed defect or encumbrance ahead of its mortgage is the fair
market value of the collateral without the undisclosed defect or
encumbrance less the fair market value of the collateral with the
undisclosed

defect or encumbrance.

Security Services

Inc. v.

Transamerican Title Insurance Co. , at p. 1221; Diversified Mortgage
Investors v. USLife Title Insurance Co., 544 F.2d 571, 574, note
2, (2d Cir. 1976) .
However, these cases are based upon breach of contract and
recovery was measured by the terms and limitations of the insurance
policies.

Under certain circumstances, the insured has the right

to sue outside the contract and is not consigned solely to contract
damages or the policy limits.

Point I of Argument, above, and

cases cited therein; Security Services Inc. v. Transamerican Title
Insurance Corp., at p. 1221.

Such circumstances that support

damages outside the contract exist in the case at bar.
As a result of the misrepresentation and other actions of
Guardian and USLife, American's loan to the Strongs was closed and
American's money disbursed.

If American would have known that its

trust deed was not in a first priority position as directed in its
escrow/closing instructions, American would not have delivered the
loan proceeds to Guardian for disbursal. There would not have been
a loan, nor any subsequent loss of American's security interest to
the Scenic Rail foreclosure.

Thus, the measure of damages to

American is what it parted with at the time of the loan, plus
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interest, less any payments made towards the loan prior to entry
of the summary judgement.

This amount was undisputed and was the

amount of the judgement awarded by Judge Moffat.
This

measure

of

damages

is

supported

by

the

breach

of

warranty/breach of duty to establish title cases set forth within
Point II of this Argument, above, and is further supported by 9
Appleman's Insurance Law and Practice, para. 5210, p. 15, which is
cited by Judge Moffat in his decision and reads as follows:
Where at the time the policy was delivered the title
was defective by reason of a lien or encumbrance,
the contract was breached and the company was
immediately liable to the insured for the actual
loss suffered.
Even under the title policy, this measure of damages was
supported by the case of Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart
Title Guarantee Co., 840 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1988) in Citicorp,
Stewart Title issued a lender's title policy to Citicorp insuring
a $27,000.00 loan. However, the borrower was not competent to sign
the trust deed when it was executed since a conservator had been
previously appointed over his estate.
Thus, the trust deed was unenforceable and the court held that
upon issuance of the policy there was an immediate breach of the
warranty against "the invalidity or unenforceability of the lien
of the insured mortgage...".
Citicorp

would

not

have

The court went on to hold that

extended

the

$27,000.00

loan

to

its

borrower if it would have known that its trust deed would not have
been enforceable.

Thus, where the title insurer does not dispute

that the fair market value of the collateral it insured was less
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than the amount loaned at the time of the loan, the measure of
damages would be the amount loaned, i.e. $27,000.00 in Citicorp's
case.
In

addition

to

the

warranty

against

the

invalidity

or

unenforceability of the lien of American, USLife breached 3 to 4
other warranties contained on the first page of the title policy.
These breached warranties included the warranty that title to the
estate was vested otherwise than stated, the warranty against any
defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title, the warranty
against priority of any other lien or encumbrance over the trust
deed of American. Thus, these warranties were breached immediately
upon issuance of the title policy and where Guardian does not
dispute that the fair market value of the collateral exceeded the
amount of the loan on the date of the loan, damages are measured
by the amount of the money loaned.
The Seventh Circuit Court went on to recognize in the Citicorp
case that the real issue was under the circumstances who should
bear the risk of a decline in the market value of the collateral.
The court reasoned that since the loan would not have been made had
the true state of the facts been revealed to Citicorp, "The policy
was breached in 1979 (the date the loan was closed), and the loss
became fixed at that time. Stewart Title should therefore bear any
risk of market value decline in the property after that time."
Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guarantee Co., at
p.530.
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Since Guardian and USLife chose to hide the truth of their
actions, they should bear the decline in market value of American's
collateral.

American simply would not have closed the loan had it

known the truth.

If Guardian and USLife would have revealed the

true state of facts and even after the money had been disbursed
would have promptly moved to pay off the Scenic Rail trust deed,
then American's security interest would not have been lost.

By

their own conscious choice, they chose to expose American to a
possible total loss of its security interest to the undisclosed
Scenic

Rail

trust

deed.

Under

these

undisputed

facts

and

circumstances, Guardian and USLife should bear the responsibility
for the entire loss of American's loan.

POINT V
AMERICAN OWED NO DUTY TO GUARDIAN AND USLIFE
TO MITIGATE DAMAGES AND AMERICAN COULD NOT
MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES.
The

undisputed

facts

show that

in

1986 American

was

in

possession of a foreclosure report from a nonparty, independent
title company showing that even though the Scenic Rail trust deed
was entitled

"A Second Trust Deed", it was recorded prior to

American's trust deed.

This foreclosure report was obtained by

American's counsel who was acting as its substituted trustee for
purposes of foreclosing American's trust deed. The facts also show
that in 1986 Scenic Rail sent American a Notice of Default and a
Notice of Sale indicating that it was foreclosing its "Second Trust
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Deed", but listing a recording date earlier than American's trust
deed.
Guardian argues that American owed it and USLife the duty to
mitigate the damages caused by the actions of Guardian and USLife
and that American failed to meet this duty by not giving USLife
notice of the Scenic Rail foreclosure.

American argues that when

the Scenic Rail notices were received, the recording date of the
Scenic Rail trust deed was not compared with the recording date of
the American trust deed because American knew its trust deed was
a first trust deed pursuant to its closing/escrow instructions and
its U.S. title policy clearly showing American in first position
with no mention of a Scenic Rail trust deed.

Further, the Scenic

Rail trust deed was entitled "A Second Trust Deed".
Guardian argues that the reasonableness of American's belief
that its trust deed was in first position is at a minimum a fact
question that should be determined at trail precluding summary
judgment.

Guardian further argues that American's possession of

the notices and the foreclosure report constitute a complete bar
to recovery.
A. GUARDIAN AND USLIFE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO "LAY-IN-WAIT" FOR THREE YEARS FOR SOMETHING
TO HAPPEN TO ABSOLVE THEM OF LIABILITY.
Guardian asks, this court to grant judicial approval to a
"lay-in-wait" strategy. Guardian and USLife failed to abide by the
escrow/closing instructions of American.

They knew that Guardian

had made a mistake and failed to pay off the Scenic Rail trust
deed. Notwithstanding this fact, they intentionally issued a false
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title policy listing American's trust deed in first position and
omitting any mention of the Scenic Rail trust deed.

They hid this

problem for three years while they attempted to obtain payment of
the Scenic Rail trust deed from the Strong's or a subordination
agreement from Scenic Rail.

Finally, they took no effort to assure

their receipt of notice of any Scenic Rail foreclosure by recording
a Request for Notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
The

doctrine

of

mitigation

of

damages

§57-1-26(1).
or

avoidable

consequences was not designed to absolve Guardian and USLife from
liability create by the total abdication of their responsibility
owed to its insured, American.

Judge Moffat so found at the trial

court level and this Court should affirm.
B.
GUARDIAN AND USLIFE KNEW OF THE SCENIC
RAIL TRUST DEED AND INTENTIONALLY HID ITS
EXISTENCE FROM AMERICANTHUS, GUARDIAN AND
USLIFE WERE BETTER ABLE THAN AMERICAN TO
MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES.
Guardian sites the cases of DeBrv and Hilton Services Inc. v.
Capital International Airways Inc., 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978), Utah
Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981),
and Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co. Inc., 743 P.2d 1212 (Utah 1987) for
the proposition that an aggrieved party may not aggravate his
damages but has a duty to actively mitigate his damages.

However,

Guardian does not cite the case of Angelos v. First Interstate Bank
of Utah, 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 1983).
In the Angelos case the Utah Supreme Court refused to apply
the avoidable consequences doctrine to that case for two reasons.
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First, the avoidable consequences doctrine does not preclude an
aggrieved party from recovering for damages sustained by future
actions of the defendant.

Second, and bearing upon the case at

bar, the doctrine of avoidable consequences does not prevent an
aggrieved party from recovering where the party causing the damage
is

in

as

good

of,

if

not

a

better, position

to

avoid

the

consequences of his action or mitigate the damages caused to the
aggrieved party.

Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah/ at p.

777.
In the

present

case, Guardian

and

USLife were

hired

by

American as professionals with particular expertise in the area of
title searches and title insurance.

American relied upon them to

adequately search the title and properly close the loan pursuant
to its instructions and issue a correct title policy. Guardian and
USLife had constructive and actual knowledge of the Scenic Rail
trust deed prior to issuing the false title policy. They were fully
aware of the consequences of their actions and also aware that
American's trust deed could be foreclosed out by Scenic Rail.
Guardian and USLife were in a superior position to mitigate
any possible damages to American.

They should have cured the

problem that they created by immediately paying off Scenic Rail.
They should not have hid the problem for over three years and then
point the finger at American, especially when they intentionally
hid the Scenic Rail trust deed from American.

At the very least,

Guardian and USLife should have recorded a Request for Notice that
would have assured their notice of any Scenic Rail foreclosure.
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C.
AMERICAN OWED NO DUTY TO GUARDIAN AND
USLIFE TO REVEAL THE SCENIC RAIL TRUST DEED OR
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FORECLOSURE OF SAID TRUST
DEED.
Guardian and USLife were professionals.

The law imposed no

duty on American to tell Guardian and USLife about the Scenic Rail
trust deed or the consequences of its foreclosure.

Guardian and

USLife knew about the trust deed and hid that knowledge

from

American.
Where a title insurer knows or should have known about a title
defect, it can not abdicate its responsibility to its insured by
claiming the insured had the duty to inform the insurer of a title
defect or encumbrance.

Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National American

Title Insurance, at p. 651; Bush v. Coulty
Transamerican
(1971);

Title

Smirlock

Insurance

v.

Title

at p. 867; Moe v.

Co., at Cal. Rptr. pp 554-557.

Guarantee

Co., at N.Y.S.2d

p. 61.

Nautilus Inc. v. Transamerican Title Insurance Co. of Washington,
15 Wash. App. 345, 534 P.2d 1388 (1975).
Guardian and USLife assumed the risk of the Scenic Rail trust
deed.

Their own actions caused the complete loss of American's

security interest, not American's failure to realize that a senior
trust deed was foreclosing out its trust deed. Guardian and USLife
intentionally hid the existence of the senior trust deed from
American.

Given

these

circumstances,

American's

actions

or

knowledge is irrelevant to the liability of Guardian and USLife.
D.
AMERICAN'S DAMAGES WERE SET ON THE DATE
GUARDIAN AND USLIFE IMPROPERLY CLOSED THE LOAN
AND ISSUED A FALSE AND FRAUDULENT TITLE
POLICY.
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As demonstrated in the preceeding points of argument herein,
the breach of contract, breach of tort duties, fraud, estoppel,
etc., occurred upon improperly closing the loan and issuing the
false title policy.

As further argued

the damages were set as of

that date.

These damages were not limited to contract damages,

constrained

by policy limits.

Since the damages had

already

accrued, they could not be mitigated at a point three years down
the road.
POINT VI
THERE WERE NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF
FACT
WHICH
PRECLUDED
SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT.
At

Point

following

VI

of

questions

its
of

Argument,

fact

existed

Guardian

argues

which

precluded

that

the

summary

judgement:
1.
What, if any, of the actions of defendants are not
included within the duties express or implied in the
indemnity contract of title insurance?
2. At exactly what point in time did plaintiff incur
damages for which it is entitle to indemnity and compensation?
3. What was the market value of the security at the time
when the damages arose?
4.
What was the difference of the value of plaintiff's
security at the time damage arose and the value of that
security had plaintiff been in a first priority position?
5. At what point was plaintiff aware that its priority was
subordinate to a prior encumbrance?
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6. Did plaintiff fail to take prompt, appropriate action to
protect its interest in the security, thereby mitigating its
damages?
7. To what extend did plaintiff's failure to mitigate affect
the amount of damages?
The first issue, i.e. interpretation of the duties owed under
the title policy is a question of law and the actions of Guardian
and USLife that breached the contract are clearly without dispute.
The

second

issue, the time when the damages

arose

is a

question of interpretation of the contract as determined by case
law.

This date was either the date the policy was issued, the

date of the Scenic Rail foreclosure sale, or the date of the claim
of American.

No facts exist that need to be resolved before this

court can determine which date is appropriate.
Where, as

in

the

case at bar, the market

value

of

the

collateral exceeded the amount of the loan on the date of the
loan, any decrease in the market value is irrelevant because it is
to be born by the insurer.
The

issue

of

foreclosure

is

insured

notify

to

encumbrance.

notice

likewise
a

to

American

irrelevant.

title

insurer

of

There
of

a

the

Scenic

Rail

is no duty of an
recorded

defect

or

There is especially no duty to notify the title

insurer where it had actual knowledge of the defect or encumbrance
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and the existence of the defect or encumbrance was intentionally
hid from the insured.
Judge Moffat considered only undisputed facts in the most
advantageous light for Guardian and USLife when he awarded summary
judgement.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN NOT
AWARDING REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES
THAT WERE NECESSARILY INCURRED BY
AMERICAN.
Judge Moffat ruled that as a matter of law there was not a
sufficient showing of a bad faith defense to justify an award of
attorneys fee on behalf of American.
A. UNDER BECK v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, THE
COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED AN AWARD OF REASONABLE
ATTORNEYS FEES THAT WERE NECESSARILY INCURRED
AMERICAN.
In

Zions

First National

Bank v. National American

BY

Title

Insurance, the Utah Supreme Court was faced with the District Court
award of attorneys fees to an insured who was forced to sue its
title insurance company for failing to provide coverage.

The

District Court had awarded attorneys fees and court costs to the
insured pursuant to a provision identical to paragraph 6(b) of the
USLife policy.

Justice Zimmerman held that the award of fees and

costs was not supportable by this policy provision.
Justice Zimmerman went on to add:
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However,

Although it does not affect the outome of this
appeal, it is worth noting that since Espinoza was
decided, and after the decision below was rendered,
we announced the existence of an implied contractual
obligation to perform a first party insurance
contract fairly and in good faith.
See Beck v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800-01
(Utah 1985).
Damages for breach of this implied
covenant can include consequential damages. Id. at
801. Attorney's fees incurred by an insured in suing
its insurer because of such a breach would be
recoverable conseguential damages because they
plainly are reasonably foreseeable by the parties
at the time the contract is made. See Id. Although
Zions did not proceed against National American on
this theory, it would arguably be available to
others similarly situated, despite the language in
the standard form contract, because the implied
covenant announced in Beck cannot be contractually
waived. Id. at 801, Note 4. [Emphasis Added]
In Point III H. of this Argument, American fully sets forth
the actions of Guardian and USLife that constitute breach of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

The record is replete

with undisputed facts concerning bad faith and total disregard of
American's rights.

Judge Moffat should not have denied attorneys

fees as a matter of law.
B. ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO
AMERICAN BASED UPON THE FRAUD COMMITTED BY
GUARDIAN AND USLIFE.
An award of attorneys fees is appropriate where a fraud has
been committed.

In Moe v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co./

the

California Court of Appeal was faced with a very similar situation
as in the case at bar.

Moe has been discussed above and its

factual discussion will not be repeated.
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The court held that where

a title agent, and its underwriter through respondeat superior,
intentionally concealed a bankruptcy proceeding in a title policy,
and it became necessary for the insured to sue the title agent and
underwriter,

an

award

of

attorneys

fees

was

"unquestionably

proper".
C. ATTORNEYS FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO
AMERICAN PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2756.
Judge Moffat errored in not granting attorneys fees based on
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.

In order to gain an award of attorneys

fees under this section, two elements must be met.

First, the

losing party's claim or defense must be "without merit", which as
determined in Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), means
bordering on frivolity.

Second, the losing party's conduct must

have been in good faith.
The actions of Guardian and USLife must met both elements.
First, American had given Guardian clear closing instruction which
were not followed, and Guardian issued a false and misleading title
policy, to cover up its mistake.

Second, Guardian and USLife

intentionally kept American in the dark to avoid an immediate claim
on the title policy.

Third, Guardian and USLife failed to take

preliminary precautions to assure that they received notice of any
Scenic Rail foreclosure by recording a Request for Notice.
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Fourth, when American

filed

a claim, the attorney's

for

Guardian and USLife embarked on actions founded in conflict of
interest.
Fifth, Guardian has asserted from the commencement of this
law suit that all that it owed to American was the amount necessary
to pay off Scenic Rail on the date of its foreclosure. Rather than
pay this amount, which was substantial and totalled $29,957,30,
Guardian and USLife forced American to file this law suit and
prosecute it for almost one year before any payment was made. This
court should remand this action to Judge Moffat to determine an
appropriate amount of attorneys fees incurred before and after this
appeal.
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN NOT
FINDING GUARDIAN AND USLIFE LIABLE
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, BUT RESERVING
THE EVIDENTIARY ISSUE OF THEIR
FINANCIAL CONDITION FOR A SUBSEQUENT
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
The trial court errored in denying American's request to find
Guardian and USLife liable for punitive damages, reserving the
issue of their financial condition for a subsequent evidentiary
hearing.

In Utah, a party is liable for punitive damages if

compensatory damages are awarded and it is established by clear
and

convincing

evidence

that

the party

breached

a

tort

duty

through willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct,
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or conduct that manifested a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. Utah Code Ann.
78-18-1(1)(a)

(1989); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988).

The actions of Guardian and USLife have been fully set forth
above.

They need not be repeated.

forth, by

undisputed

facts, conduct

However, they clearly set
that was

knowing

and

in

reckless disregard of the rights of American.
Further,

USLife

is

liable

for

punitive

damages

as

a

"managerial agent" of Guardian, as such term is defined within the
Restatement (Second) of Agency §217C and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, §909, as adopted in Utah within Johnson v. Rogers, at
p. 776.
The Contract of Agency between Guardian and USLife, a copy
of which is included within the addendum hereto as Exhibit "J",
provided that Guardian had the authority on behalf of USLife to
issue title insurance commitments, examine the title of property
upon which such commitments would be based, to correctly reflect
the condition on the title on such commitments and title policies,
to collect premiums on behalf

of USLife and keep 80% of the

premiums, and to properly and regularly close transactions upon
which the commitment or policy was predicated.

Based upon such a

contract, Guardian clearly had a broad scope of authority, was
acting within the scope of authority with respect to all actions
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taken on behalf of or against American, and clearly met the test
of a "managerial agent" or an agent employed in a

"managerial

capacity".
This court should hold that Guardian and USLife are clearly
responsible

for punitive damages

to American

and

remand

this

action to the trial court for a determination of their financial
condition and an appropriate amount of punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the descision of the trial court as
to complensatory damages and reserse the descision

as to the

denial of attorney's fees and punitive damages remanding to the
trial court the determination of the amount of fees and amount of
punitive damages.

Respectfully submitted this

/J—

day of-J**£y, 1990

Lester A. Perry
Attorney for New West Federal Savings
& Loan Association, as Receiver for
American Savings.
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ance, may not exceed 50% of the capital and surplus
of the insurer.
1985

31A-20-110. Underwriting rules for title insurance.
(1) No title insurance policy may be written until
the title insurer or its agent has conducted a reasonable search and examination of the title and has
made a determination of insurability of title under
sound underwriting principles. Evidence of this
search and reasonable determination shall be retained in the files of the title insurer or its agent for
not less than 15 years after the policy has been issued, either in its original form or as recorded by any
process which can accurately and reliably reproduce
the original. This section does not apply to a company
assuming liability through a contract of reinsurance,
or to a company acting as comsurer, if another coinsuring company has complied with this section.
(2) No title insurance policy may be issued except
by a title insurance company or by an agent licensed
under Section 31A-23-203.
(3) This section is enforceable only by the commissioner. It does not create, eliminate, or modify any
private cause of action or remedy.
1985
CHAPTER 21
INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
Part I
General Rules
Section
31A-2M01.
31A-21-102.
31A-2M03.
31A-21-104.
31A-21-105.
31A-21-106.
31A-21-107.
31A-21-108.

Scope of Chapters 21 and 22, Title
31A.
Oral contracts of insurance and
binders.
Capacity to contract.
Insurance interest and consent.
Representations, warranties, and conditions.
Incorporation by reference.
Contract rights under noncomplying
policies.
Subrogation actions.

Part n
Approval of Forms
31A-21-201.
31A-21-202.
31A-21-203.

Filing and approval of forms.
Explicit approval required.
Authorized clauses for insurance
forms.
Part III

Specific Clauses in Contracts
31A-21-301.
31A-21-302.
31A-21-303.
31A-21-304.
31A-21-305.
31A-21-306.

Clauses required to be in a prominent
position.
Premiums.
Termination of insurance policies by
insurers.
Special cancellation provisions.
Cancellation upon request of a premium finance company.
Policies or surety bonds jointly issued.

Section
31A-21-311.
31A-21-312.
31A-21-313.
31A-21-314.

31A-21-102
Group and
Notice and
Limitation
Prohibited

blanket insurance.
proof of loss.
of actions.
provisions.

Part IV
Mass Marketed Life or Disability I n s u r a n c e
31A-21-401.
31A-21-402.
31A-21-403.
31A-21-404.

Scope and construction of part.
Definitions.
Orders terminating effectiveness of
policies.
Out-of-state insurers.
PART I
GENERAL RULES

31A-21-101. Scope of Chapters 21 and 22, Title
31A.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through
(6), this chapter and Chapter 22 apply to all insurance policies, applications, and certificates:

(a) delivered or issued for delivery in this
state;
(b) on property ordinarily located in this state;
(c) on persons residing in this state when the
policy is issued; and
(d) on business operations in this state.
(2) This chapter and Chapter 22 do not apply to:
(a) the exemptions provided in Section
31A-1-103;
(b) insurance policies procured under Sections
31A-15-103 and 31A-15-104;
(c) an insurance policy on business operations
in this state if the contract is negotiated primarily outside this state and if the operations in this
state are incidental or subordinate to operations
outside this state, except that insurance required
by a Utah statute must conform to the statutory
requirements; or
(d) other exemptions provided in this title.
(3) Sections 31A-21-102, 31A-21-103, 31A-21-104,
Subsections 31A-21-107(1) and (3), and Sections
31A-21-306, 31A-21-308, 31A-21-312, and 31A-21314 apply to ocean marine and inland marine insurance. Section 31A-21-201 applies to inland marine
insurance that is written according to manual rules
or rating plans.
(4) Group or blanket policies are subject to this
chapter and Chapter 22, except:
(a) group or blanket policies outside the scope
of this title under Subsection 31A-1-103 (3) (h);
and
(b) other exemptions provided under Subsection (5).
(5) The commissioner may by rule exempt any
class of insurance contract or class of insurer from
any or all of the provisions of this chapter and Chapter 22 if the interests of the Utah insureds, creditors,
or the public would not be harmed by the exemption.
(6) Workers' compensation insurance, including
that written by the Workers' Compensation Fund of
Utah, is subject to this chapter and Chapter 22.
(7) Unless clearly inapplicable, any provision of
this chapter or Chapter 22 applicable to either a pol-
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(2) No licensee under this chapter may act as to the
same client as both an agent and broker without the
client's prior written consent based on full disclosure
(3) Whenever a person applies for insurance coverage through a broker, the broker shall disclose to the
applicant, in writing, that the broker is not the agent
of the potential insurer This disclosure shall also inform the applicant that the applicant likely does not
have the benefit of an insurer being financially responsible for the broker's conduct
1989
31A-23-302. Unfair marketing practices.
(1) (a) d) No person who is or should be licensed
under this title, no employee or agent of that
licensee or person who should be licensed, no
person whose primary interest is as a competitor of a person licensed under this title,
and no person on behalf of any of these persons may make or cause to be made any communication which contains false or misleading information, relating to an insurance
contract, any insurer, or other licensee under
this title, including information which is
false or misleading because it is incomplete
(11) As used in this subsection, "false or
misleading information" includes, but is not
limited to
(A) assuring the nonobhgatory payment of future dividends or refunds of
unused premiums in any specific or approximate amounts, but reporting fully
and accurately past experience is not
false or misleading information, and
(B) with intent to deceive a person examining it, filing a report, making a
false entry in a record, or wilfully refraining from making a proper entry in
a record
(in) No insurer or other licensee under
this title may use any business name, slogan, emblem, or related device that is misleading or likely to cause the insurer or
other licensee to be mistaken for another insurer or other licensee already in business
(IV) No person who is not an insurer may
assume or use any name that deceptively implies or suggests that it is an insurer
(v) No person other than persons licensed
as health maintenance organizations under
Chapter 8 may use the term "Health Maintenance Organization" or "HMO" m referring
to itself

j j

(b) If an insurance agent or third5 party administrator distributes cards or documents, exhibits
a sign, or publishes an advertisement that violates Subsection (l)(a), with reference to a particular insurer that the agent represents, or for
whom the third party administrator processes
claims, and if the cards, documents, signs, or advertisements are supplied or approved by that
insurer, the agent's or the third party administrator's violation creates a rebuttable presumption that the violation was also committed by the
insurer
(2) (a) No insurer, no licensee under this chapter,
and no officer or employee of either may induce
any person to enter into an insurance contract or
to terminate an existing insurance contract by
offering benefits not specified in the policy to be
issued, including premium or commission rebates, nor may any insurer make or knowingly
allow any agreement of insurance that is not

31A-23-302

clearly expressed in the policy to be issued This
subsection does not preclude insurers from reducing premiums because of expense savings, nor
does this subsection preclude the usual kinds of
social courtesies not related to particular transactions This subsection does not bar an insurer
from receiving premiums under an installment
payment plan
(b) No agent, broker, or insurer may absorb
the tax under Subsection 31A-3-301
(c) (l) No title insurer or agent or any officer or
employee of either may pay, allow, give, or
offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as an inducement to obtaining any
title insurance business, any rebate, reduction, or abatement of any rate or charge
made incident to the issuance of the insurance, any special favor or advantage not generally available to others, or any money or
other consideration or material inducement
(u) "Charge made incident to the issuance
of the insurance" includes escrow, settlement, and closing charges, and any other
services which are prescribed by the commissioner
(m) No insured or any other person connected directly or indirectly with the transaction, including a mortgage lender, real estate broker, builder, attorney, or any officer,
employee, or agent of any of them, may
knowmgly receive or accept, directly or indirectly, any benefit referred to in Subsection
(2)(c)(i)
(3) No insurer may unfairly discriminate among
policyholders by charging different premiums or by
offering different terms of coverage, except on the basis of classifications related to the nature and the
degree of the n s k covered or the expenses involved.
Rates are not unfairly discriminatory if they are averaged broadly among persons insured under a group,
blanket, or franchise policy, and the terms of those
policies are not unfairly discriminatory merely because they are more favorable than in similar individual policies
(4) No person who is or should be licensed under
this title, no employee or agent of that licensee or
person who should be licensed, no person whose primary interest is as a competitor of a person licensed
under this title, and no one acting on behalf of any of
these persons, may commit or enter into any agreement to participate in any act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation which tends to produce an unreasonable
restraint of the business of insurance or a monopoly
in that business
(5) No person may restrict in the choice of an insurer or insurance agent or broker, another person
who is required to pay for insurance as a condition for
the conclusion of a contract or other transaction or for
the exercise of any right under a contract The person
requiring the coverage may, however, reserve the
right to disapprove the insurer or the coverage selected on reasonable grounds The form of corporate
organization of an insurer authorized to do business
in this state is not a reasonable ground for disapproval, and the commissioner may by rule specify additional grounds that are not reasonable This subsection does not bar an insurer from declining an application for insurance
(6) No person may make any charge other than
insurance premiums and premium financing charges
for the protection of property or of a security interest
in property, as a condition for obtaining, renewing, or

31A-23-303
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continuing the financing of a purchase of the property
or the lending of money on the security of an interest
in the property
(7) No agent may refuse or fail to return promptly
all indicia of agency to the principal on demand No
licensee whose license is suspended, limited, or revoked under Section 31A-2-308, 31A-23-216, or
31A-23-217 may refuse or fail to return the license to
the commissioner on demand
(8) No person may engage in any other unfair
method of competition or any other unfair or deceptive act oi practice in the business of insurance, as
defined by the commissioner, by rule, after a finding
that they are misleading, deceptive, unfairly discriminatory, provide an unfair inducement, or unreasonably restrain competition
1987
31A-23-303. Inherent unsuitability.
In the event the commissioner finds after a hearing
that a certain type of disability insurance, life insurance, or annuity product is inherently unsuitable for
persons of certain ages or in certain conditions of
health, the commissioner shall promulgate a rule declaring this disability insurance, life insurance, or
annuity product as inherently unsuitable for persons
of certain ages or m certain conditions of health No
disability insurance, life insurance, or annuity product that is subject to the rule may be sold to a person
for whom the product has been determined as inherently unsuitable unless that person purchasing the
product signs a receipt acknowledging having received a statement which expresses that the product
has been determined by the commissioner to be inherently unsuitable for persons of certain ages or in
certain conditions of health Unless the insurer or its
agent establishes that its sale of coverage which is
inconsistent with the rule is due to excusable neglect,
the purchaser may treat the sale as voidable, if acted
upon by the insured within a two-year period from
the date oi sale
1986
31A-23-304. Extension of credit on premiums.
The extension of credit upon a premium by an
agent or broker to the insured, without interest for
not exceeding 90 days from the effective date of the
policy, or after that time with interest on the unpaid
balance at not less than the legal rate under Section
15-1-1, is not a violation of Subsection 31A-23-302(2)
The installment or payroll deduction payment of premiums on policies issued under an insurer's mass
marketing program is not an extension of credit
1985

31A-23-305.

Insurer liability.

(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that every
insurer is bound by any act of its agent performed m
this state that is within the scope of the agent's actual (express or implied) or apparent authonty, until
the insurer has cancelled the agent's appointment
and has made reasonable efforts to recover from the
agent its policy forms and other indicia of agency
Reasonable efforts include a formal demand in writing for return of the indicia, and notice to the commissioner if the agent does not promptly comply with
the demand This subsection neither waives any common law defense available to insurers, nor precludes
the insured from seeking redress against the agent
individually or jointly against the insurer and agent
(2) When a property/liability insurance agent with
authority to bind more than one insurer on a particular risk agrees to bind coverage on a particular risk,
but fails to outwardly indicate the insurer with which
the risk is placed, and before the risk is placed with a
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particular insurer a loss occurs, if there is no conclusive admissible evidence indicating the insurer with
which the agent exercised his binding authority, a
court may equitably apportion the loss among all insurers with which the agent had binding authority as
to the particular type of risk
1986
31A-23-306. Countersignature requirement.
Whenever the laws of any other state require that a
fixed fee or commission be paid its resident agents to
countersign an insurance policy, all insurance companies of that state doing business within Utah shall
pay a fee or commission to Utah resident agents on
the same terms and conditions as provided by the
laws of the other state
1985
31A-23-307. Title insurance agents' business.
A title insurance agent may engage m the escrow,
settlement, or closing business, or any combination of
such businesses, and operate as escrow, settlement, or
closing agent provided that all the following exist
(1) The title insurance agent is properly licensed under this chapter
(2) (a) All funds deposited with the agent m
connection with any escrow, settlement, or
closing are deposited in a federally insured
financial institution in separate trust accounts, with the funds being the property of
the persons entitled to them under the provisions of the escrow, settlement, or closing
The funds shall be segregated escrow by escrow, settlement by settlement, or closing by
closing in the records of the agent These
funds are not subject to any debts of the
agent and may only be used to fulfill the
terms of the individual escrow, settlement,
or closing under which the funds were accepted None of the funds may be used until
all conditions of the escrow, settlement, or
closmg have been met
(b) Any interest received on funds deposited with the agent m connection with any
escrow, settlement, or closing shall be paid
over to the depositing party to the escrow,
settlement, or closing and may not be transferred to the account of the agent
(c) No check may be drawn, executed, or
dated unless the segregated escrow account
against which it is drawn contains a sufficient credit balance consisting of collected or
cleared funds, at the tune the check is
drawn, executed, or dated
(3) The^, title insurance agent shall maintain
records of all receipts and disbursements of escrow, settlement, and closing funds
(4) The title insurance agent shall comply
with any rules adopted by the commissioner governing escrows, settlements, or closings.
1989
31A-23-308. Liability of title insurers for acts of
title insurance agents.
Any title company, represented by one or more title
insurance agents, is directly and primarily liable to
others dealing with the title insurance agents for the
receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, closings, or settlements with the title insurance agents m all those transactions where a commitment or binder for or policy or contract of title insurance of that title insurance company has been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title insurance
company has been issued or distributed This liability
does not modify, mitigate, impair, or affect the con-
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tractual obligations between the title insurance
agents and the title insurance company
1985

31A-23-312

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the insured
pays an agent or broker, knowing the agent or broker
does not intend to submit the premium to the insurer
31A-23-309. Representations of agency.
(3) In the case of an employer who has received the
No person may represent himself as the agent of an premium by deducting all or part of it from the wages
insurer unless a written agency contract is in effect or salaries of the certificate holders, t h e insurer may
giving the person authority from the insurer
1985 terminate its liability by giving certificate holders
reasonable notice of coverage termination The liabil31A-23-310. Trust obligation for funds col- ity of the insurer terminates at the later of
lected.
(a) the last day of the coverage penod for
(1) Every agent or broker is a trustee for all funds
which premium has been withheld by t h e emreceived or collected as an agent or broker for forployer, or
warding to insurers or to insureds Except for
(b) 15 days after the date the insurer mails
amounts necessary to pay bank charges, and except
actual notice to the certificate holder that coverfor funds paid by insureds and belonging in part to
age has terminated, but in the event the insurer
the agent or broker as fees or commissions, no agent
fails to provide actual notice as required by this
or broker may commingle trust funds with his own
subsection, then the insurance shall terminate
funds or with funds held m any other capacity Ex45 days from the last date for which- premium
cept as provided under Subsection (4), every agent or
was received
broker owes to insureds and insurers the fiduciary
(4) Despite a n employer's collection of premium
duties of a trustee with respect to money to be for- under Subsection (1), the responsibility of an insurer
warded to insurers or insureds through the agent or to continue to provide insurance to group policy cerbroker Unless t h e funds are sent to the appropnate tificate holders terminates upon the effective date of
payee by the close of the next business day after their notice from the policyholder that
receipt, t h e licensee shall deposit them in an account
(a) coverage of a similar kind and quality has
authorized under Subsection (2) Funds so deposited
been obtained from another insurer, or
shall remain in an account authorized under Subsec(b) the policyholder is electing to voluntarily
tion (2) until sent to t h e appropnate payee
terminate t h e certificate holder's coverage and
has given t h e employees notice of the termina(2) Funds required to be deposited under Subsection.
tion (1) shall be deposited
(5) If the insurer or a certificate holder has a valid
(a) in a federally insured trust account with a
claim against a n employer under Subsection (1) for
financial institution located in this state, or
(b) in some other account, approved by t h e failure to forward the premium, the claim may incommissioner by rule or order, providing safety clude reasonable expenses of suit and reasonable attorney's fees
comparable to federally insured trust accounts
(6) If, under an employee health insurance plan, a n
(3) It is not a violation of Subsection (2)(a) if t h e
amounts in t h e accounts exceed the amount of t h e employee builds up credit for future coverage because
he has not used the policy protection, or in some other
federal insurance on t h e accounts
(4) A trust account into which funds are deposited way, the insurer is obligated to the employee for that
may be interest b e a n n g Except as provided under future coverage earned while the policy was in full
1989
Subsection 31A-23-307(2)(b), the interest accrued on effect
the account m a y be paid to the agent or broker, so
long as t h e agent or broker otherwise complies with 31A-23-312. Place of business and residence address — Records.
this section and with t h e contract with the insurer
(1) Every licensee under this chapter shall register
(5) No financial institution or other organization with t h e commissioner the address of his pnncipal
holding trust funds under this section may offset or place of business and, if the hcensee is an individual,
impound trust account funds against debts and obli- his residence address where the licensee may be readgations incurred by t h e agent or broker
ily contacted m person, by mail, and by telephone
(6) Any licensee who, not being lawfully entitled The licensee shall notify t h e commissioner promptly
thereto, diverts or appropnates any portion of the of any change in the address or telephone number of
funds held under Subsection (1) to his own use, is his pnncipal place of business or residence
guilty of theft under Part 4 of Chapter 6, Title 76
(2) Except as provided under Subsection (3), every
Section 76-6-412 applies in determining the classifi- licensee under this chapter shall keep a t the principal
cation of the offense Sanctions under Section place of business address registered under Subsection
31A-2-308 also apply
1986 (1), a record of all transactions consummated under
the Utah license The record shall be in a n organized
31A-23-311. Insurer's liability if insured pays form and shall mclude all the following
premium to agent, broker, or group
(a) if the licensee is an agent or broker
policyholder.
d) a record of each insurance contract pro(1) Subject to Subsections (2) and (5), if an insurer,
cured by or issued through the licensee, with
including a surplus lines insurer, has assumed a n s k
the names of insurers and insureds, t h e
and if the premium for that insurance has been reamount of premium and commissions or
ceived by an agent or broker who placed the insurother compensation, and t h e subject of the
ance or by a group policyholder, including an eminsurance,
ployer who deducts part or all of the premium from
(n) t h e names of any other agents or brothe employees' wages or salary, then as between the
kers from whom business is accepted, and of
insurer and the insured, the insurer is considered to
persons to whom commissions or allowances
have received the premium and is liable to the inof any kind are promised or paid,
sured for losses covered by the insurance and for any
(b) if the hcensee is a consultant, a record of
unearned premiums upon cancellation of the insureach agreement outlining the work performed
ance
and the fee for the work,
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(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons,
and their agents, officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area
1979
78-27-53- Inherent risks of skiing — Bar against
claim or recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in sport.
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier may make
any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent
risks of skiing
1986
78-27-54. Inherent r i s k s of s k i i n g — T r a i l
boards listing inherent risks and limitations on liability.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or
more prominent locations within each ski area which
shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and
the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as
defined m this act
1979
78-27-55. Repealed.

1980

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — A w a r d where action
or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith, except under Subsection (2)
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees
or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1),
but only if the court
(a) finds the party h a s filed a n affidavit of
impecuniosity in t h e action before the court, or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for
not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1)
1988
78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights
to recover attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon
any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or
other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees
1986
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state
funded agency in action against state
or subdivision — Forfeit of appropriated monies.
Any agency or organization receiving state funds
which, as a result of its suing t h e state, or political
•abdmsion thereof, receives attorney's fees and costs
•s all or part of a settlement or award, shall forfeit to
« e General Fund, from its appropriated monies, an
•mount equal to the attorney's fees received.
1981
I*
78-27-58. Service of judicial process b y persons
fe*
' other than l a w enforcement officers.
L***ersons who are not peace officers, constables,
•henffs, or lawfully appointed deputies of such officers or authonzed state investigators in counties of
*j0,000 persons or more are not entitled to serve any
Sp&s of civil or criminal process other than com* " ats, summonses, and subpoenas
1983
;27-59. Immunity for transient shelters.
J) As used in this section, "transient shelter"
any person which provides shelter, food, cloth-

78-27a-3

ing, or other products or services without consideration to indigent persons
(2) Except as provided m Subsection (3), all transient shelters, owners, operators, and employees of
transient shelters, and persons who contribute products or services to transient shelters, are immune
from suit for damages or injuries ansing out of or
related to the damaged or injured person's use of the
products or services provided by the transient shelter
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against
a person for damages or injury intentionally caused
by that person or resulting from his gross negligence

C H A P T E R 27a
SMALL B U S I N E S S E Q U A L A C C E S S T O
JUSTICE ACT
Section
78-27a-l
78-27a-2
78-27a-3
78-27a-4
78-27a-5
78-27a-6

Short title
Legislative findings — Purpose
Definitions
Litigation expense award authorized m
actions by state
Litigation expense award authorized in
appeals from administrative decisions
Payment of expenses awarded — Statement required in agency's budget

78-27a-l. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Small Business Equal Access to Justice Act."
1983
78-27a-2. Legislative findings — Purpose.
The Legislature finds t h a t small businesses may be
deterred from seeking review of or defending against
substantially unjustified governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights The purpose of this act is to entitle small businesses, under conditions set forth m this
act, to recover reasonable litigation expenses.
1983
78-27a-3. Definitions.
As used in this act
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final
judgment, the right to all appeals having been
exhausted, on t h e merits, on substantially all
counts or charges in the action and with respect
to the most significant issue or set of issues presented, but does not include the settlement of any
action, either by stipulation, consent decree or
otherwise, whether or not settlement occurs before or after any hearing or trial.
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means
court costs, administrative h e a n n g costs, attorney's fees, and witness fees of all necessary witnesses, not m excess of $10,000, which a court
finds were reasonably incurred in opposing action covered under this act.
(3) "Small business" means a commercial or
business entity, including a sole proprietorship,
which does not have more than 250 employees,
but does not include an entity which is a subsidiary or affiliate of another entity which is not a
small business
(4) "State" means any department, board, institution, hospital, college, or university of t h e
state of Utah or any political subdivision thereof,
except with respect to antitrust actions brought
under Part 9 of Chapter 10 of Title 76.
1983

Rule 5£XHIBIT "fflAJLKULES OF
as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs, provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review shall abide the final determination of the
cause Costs against the state of Utah, its officers
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his
costs must within five days after the entry of
judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding A party
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within
seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed
by the court in which the judgment was rendered
A memorandum of costs served and filed after
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date judgment is entered
(3), (4) [Deleted ]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the
judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket
(Amended effective January 1, 1985)
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default
(2) Notice to party in default After the
entry of the default of any party, as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaultmg party
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served
otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if

CIVIL PROCEDURE

478

he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to
the court therefor If, in order to enable the court
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c)
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court
(Amended, effective Sept 4, 1985 )
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment m his favor upon all or any part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a tnal is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what matenal facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not m controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the
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facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
tr\2A shall be conducted accordingly
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U C A 1953,
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and
may advance it on the calendar.
Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith
signed by the clerk and filed
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided
m Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is
complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a hen on real property,
when the same is signed and filed as herein above
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-

Rule 58B

tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the
^udgmftirt, dackfct
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk
of the court However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of
this provision
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be
rendered thereon
(0 Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authonzed by statute, the party
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement,
verified by the defendant, to the following effect
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due,
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for
a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of
entry, if any
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985 and Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be satisfied, m whole or m part, as to any
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof,
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
following manner (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
judgment m the county where first docketed, with the
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming
them.
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof,
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered
upon the docket
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case,
and enter it on the register of actions He shall also
enter a bnef statement of the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction.
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any
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Le ila Brand
Senior L i q u i d a t i o n Counselor
A m e r i c a n S a v i n g s & Loan Association
540 East M a i n Street
Stockton, California
95202
R E : L e t t e r Respecting Claim Under U . S . Life
P o l i c y No. M 0 8 4 7 2 9

Title

Dear M s . B r a n d :
I represent Guardian Title Company with respect to your
notice of c l a i m under date of March 9, 1987 in connection with
the referenced policyP l e a s e be advised that I have been engaged in d i s c u s s i o n s
with M r * Lester P e r r y at Kirton, M c C o n k i e <5c Bushnell regarding
this m a t t e r .
B a s e d on my discussion with M r . Perry, I have filed
a p e t i t i o n in the U . S . Bankruptcy Court for the District of U t a h ,
Central D i v i s i o n , seeking to reopen the bankruptcy case of the
b o r r o w e r s , Lynn Strong and C h e r i e Strong.
I have also commenced
a civil a c t i o n on behalf of G u a r d i a n and American Savings (with
the p e r m i s s i o n of M r . Perry in this regard) seeking' to set aside
the trustee's sale conducted by Scenic Rail Credit Union
(formerly known as Brotherhood of Railway Clerk's Credit U n i o n )
which w a s held on February 23, 1987. In connection with the
civil a c t i o n in the Third District Court of Salt Lake C o u n t y ,
State of U t a h , I have recorded a Lis Pendens against the subject
p r o p e r t y to give notice of the pendency of the action.
P l e a s e be advised that the actions that I have taken on
behalf of A m e r i c a n Savings are being done under a reservation of
rights r e s p e c t i n g defenses that m a y exist under the policy,
p a r t i c u l a r l y but without limitation, the defenses respecting
A m e r i c a n ^ o b l i g a t i o n to give prompt notice of the claim and to
p r e s e r v e and protect U.S Life's and G u a r d i a n ' s rights to cure and
remedy d e f e c t s in title.

Leila Brand
American Savings
March 13, 1987
Page 2
I w i l l b e f o r w a r d i n g a copy of the p l e a d i n g s that a r e
be i n** filed to L e s t e r Perry w h o I a m a d v i s e d is c o u n s e l on your
If y o u s h o u l d h a v e further
b e h a l f r e s p e c t i n g this m a t t e r .
i nqui r ie s , it m a y b e a p p r o p r i a t e for s u c h i n q u i r i e s to be m a d e
t h r o u g h Mr, Perry.
Very truly yours,

s'
LBM/j s
cc

Lester Perry
Guardian Title

y

vP
a-

L, Benson Mabey
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey
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Hansen & Anderson
Attorneys at Law
in T. Andenon
5«rt M. Andtfion
>J C Anderson
>tt R. Carpenter
>ert C D*lthunty
ven W. Dougherty
wn C Ferrtn
art A. f r . 4 m ^
wdon Hin»#fi
f D. Jonei

Thorn** H JUrrenberf
David £ Leu
ftusieff H. Lowe
John 6 Mtycock
fttke O.MIMer
Wlfi J Am P. Schwartz
Mmle j.Sweofon

V*il«y Tower 8uildlng
SO West flrotdway. Sixth floor
Stit U k e City. Utih M101

Telaphone (601) 532-7520
Telecopier (501) 364-7*97

C U * O.WWkfcln.

Bruce Wvcoff

April 17, 1987

^

Ms, Leila Brand
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION
540 East Main Street
Stockton, California 95202
Claim Against U.S. Life Title Insurance Company of Dallas
Insurance Policy M-084729
CL 161-87
Dear Ms. Brand:
We represent Title USA Insurance Corporation ("Company") in connection
with a claim by American Savings & Loan Association ("American") against titte
insurance policy no. M-084729 ("Policy"). The Company acknowledges receipt of
American's claim dated March 9, 1987.
At the Company's request, we are in the process of evaluating the facts and
circumstances underlying the claim. We expect to complete that evaluation
within the next ten days and will advise you of it at that time.
In the meantime, we are advised that Guardian's legal counsel, L. Benson
Mabey, has Instituted (i) a motion to reopen a bankruptcy case filed by the original
owners of the subject property, M# Lynn Strong and Cheri G. Strong, and (ii) a
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil
No. C-87-6829 (the "State Court Action"), on behalf of both Guardian and
American, His purported justification for acting on American's behalf is under a
"reservation of rights" theory under the Policy. The Company has advised Mr.
Mabey that he Is not authorized to act on behalf of American on a reservation of
rights basis or any other basis. Accordinglyr to the extent Mr. Mabey has created
the- Impression'that he is authorized to act ombehalf ot the Company, please be
assured that he is not.
Finally, to assist us in our evaluation of the claim, we would appreciate
receiving from American the following information:

Hansen & Anderson
Ms. Leila Brand
April 17, 1987
Page 2

a.
An Itemization of what efforts, if any, American undertook
to advise the Company of the then pending foreclosure proceeding instituted by
Scenic Rail Credit Union;
b.
for that fact; and,

If no such notice was provided, an Indication of the reason(s)

c.
An indication as to whether or not American appeared at the
trusteed sale and, if it did, an Indication of the action, If any, that it took at such
sale.
We look forward to hearing from you in the very near future.
Very truly yours,

JoKh T. Anderson
JTA:clm
cc Mr. John C. Mulvihill
Jack Silver, Esq.
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Hansen & Anderson
Attorneys at Law
John T Anderson
Robert M.Anderson
Ross C.Anderson
Scott R. Carpenter
Robert C Delahunty
Steven W. Dougherty
Shawn C. Femn
Stuart A. Fredman
J.Gordon Hansen
Cary D.Jones

Thomas R. Karrenberg
David tLeta
Russell H. Lowe
John B.Maycock
Blake a Miller
William P. Schwartz
Jamie J. Swenson
Glen D.Watkins
Bruce Wycoff

Valley Tower Building
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone (801) 532-7520
Telecopier (801) 364-7697

July 6, 1987
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David M. Wahlquist, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE <5c BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

~

SaJt Lake City, ui 64 n i

Claim Against USLife Title Insurance Company of Dallas
(Title USA) Policy No, M-084729
CL: 161-87
Dear David:
Thank you for your letter of June 18, 1987 articulating the position of your
client, American Savings <5c Loan Association ("American"), in the above matter.
While I appreciate and agree with your statement that Guardian Title
Company of Utah ("Guardian") should have provided timely notice to my client,
Title USA (the "Company"), of Guardian's omission of the Scenic Rail Credit
Union's trust deed lien as an exception to the subject policy of title insurance, I
am hard pressed to understand American's contention that that failure was the
proximate cause of loss under the policy.
Indeed, there are a number of factors militating in favor of a finding that it
was American, and not Title USA or Guardian, that had the last clear chance to
avoid loss under the policy: (i) the Strongs' bankruptcy schedules, of which
American had at least constructive knowledge, reflect that the Credit Union lien
was superior and paramount to American's trust deed lien, (ii) prudent preparation
of American's motion for relief from the automatic stay imposed by the Strongs'
bankruptcy filing should have led to the discovery of the priority of the Credit
Union's trust deed lien, (iii) on the two occasions that your office ordered
foreclosure reports on the Strongs' property — August, 1986, in connection with
the preparation of the original initial notice of default, and November, 1986, in
connection with the preparation of the second notice of default — no one
discerned the obvious and easily recognizable fact that the Credit Union lien had
priority over American's trust deed lien, (iv) Lester Perry frankly acknowledged to
Guardian's counsel, L. Benson Mabey, that Mr. Perry was "concerned" and
"alarmed11 that his paralegal did not discover the foregoing fact, (v) the extensive
period of time available to American to discern and assess the junior position of

Hansen & Anderson
David M. Wahlquist, Esq.
July 6, 1987
Page 2
its trust deed lien and apprise the Company of that fact, and, (vi) the established
commercial standards and guidelines imposing on counsel the obligation to review
promptly any foreclosure report to ascertain the existence of any title defects in
an expeditious manner calculated to prevent unnecessary losses.
In other words, the Company is still mystified by American's failure to
provide notice to the Company and/or Guardian at any time between August, 1986
and February, 1987, of the existence of the Credit Union trust deed lien.
Obviously, if the apparent title defect represented by that lien had been disclosed
to the Company, appropriate arrangements could have been made to satisfy the
principal amount of the underlying obligation — approximately $27,131.00.
Instead, because of American's failure to give notice to the Company of either the
pendency of the foreclosure proceedings or the impending sales date, property
having a fair market value of approximately $75,000.00 was sold for a discount of
some $50,000.00. The Company would be interested in knowing why American
apparently never considered bidding in at the foreclosure sale to protect its
interest in the property and preserve the resulting equity for the benefit of all
parties.
In light of the foregoing, the Company is prepared to pay to American only
the principal sum of $27,131.00 plus such interest as may be negotiated. The
Company will not, however, honor any claim in excess of that amount.
Finally, the Company will, of course, direct all further correspondence and
contacts regarding this matter through your office.
Very truly yours,

Jonfc T. Anderson
JTAtclm
cc John C. Mulvihill, Esq.

EXHIBIT "

Contract cf Agency

THIS COtiTRACT by *nd between USLIFE TITLE JNSURANCL COMPANY OF
DALLAS, a Corporation d u l y organized and e x i s t i n g under the laws of the
S t a t e of Texas, with i t s d o m i c i l e and p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of b u s i n e s s in D a l l a s .
D a l l a s County, Texas, h e r e i n a f t e r referred t o as the "COMPANY," and. Guardian
T i t l e Company of Utah, a corporation, duly organized and e x i s t i n g under the
laws of the State of Utah with i t s domicile and p r i n c i p a l place of business
in the City o f
S a l t Lake C i t y
. County of
S a l t Lake
S t a t e of
Tjtah
, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as "AGENT";

benefit:

,

WITNESSETH THE FOLJjOWr'C. that for and in consideration of th*
czzru^ny t« c«»cn, the pax t i e * tie*eto covenant and agree as f o l l o w s :

dav
SECTION T For a p e r i o d t o commence on the
1st
o f Mar en
,
1** 73 , and t o continue u n t i l terminated as Hereinafter pxevaded, the
COMPANY hereby appoints t h e AGEWT i t s agent v.itii authority * o i s s u e i n t e r i m
t i t l e insurance ^owptitments ( h e r e i n a f t e r referred t o as Commitment or
Commitments) ^and p o l i c e * * , * i £ ^ t i t l e insurance ( h e r e i n a f t e r referred t o as
P o l i c y o r P o l i c i e s ) of t h e COMPANY both on forms furnished the AGENT by
the COMPANY, sucn a c t s t o be done only with reference t o r e a l e s t a t e l o c a t e d
in the t e r r i t o r y of the AGCJT. which t e r r i t o r y i s f u l l y s e t out and shown
immediately f o l l o w i n g S e c t i o n I , hereof, provided t h a t nothing h e r e i n
c o n t a i n e d s h a l l a u t h o r i z e t h e AGENT to i s s u e a Commitment or P o l i c y in an
amount i n e x c e s s of S 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
unless e x p r e s s l y authorized by the
COMPANY t o do s o . The c o s t o f any coinsurance or reinsurance involved
s h a l l be deducted and p a i d t o COMPANY before computing the underwriting
r i s k premium due the COMPANY as h e r e i n a f t e r provided. The AGENT a c c e p t s
such appointment.

TERRITORY OF AGENT
S a l t Lake County
The above d e f i n i t i o n
the AGE'«T fron s o l i c i t i n g t i t l e
and/or P o l i c i e s of the CO'IPANY
e x c e p t m those c o u n t i e s where

of the AGENT'S t e r r i t o r y s h a l l not preclude
insurance b u s i n e s s and i s s u i n g Commitments
in other c o u n t i e s o f the State of
y^rqj
the COMPANY 15 represented by another a g e n t .

SECTION II
Commitrcntn and P o l i c i e s so issued by the AGENT s h a l l be
based on the examination o f t i t l e by an examiner approved by the COMPA"/
( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as "APPROVED EXAMINERS"). A l l Commitments i s s u e d
must be signed by an APPROVED EXAMINER and a copy of s a i d Commitment f o r warded t o the CO:*PA*JY along w i t h a co«iy of the Tolicy o^ P o l i c i e s s u b s e q u e n t l y issued in c o n n e c t i o n with said Commitment. In the event t h a t a
P o l i c y i s issued when t h e r e has been no previous Commitment i s s u e d , a
s i g n e d , w r i t t e n E t a n i n e r ' e r e p o r t must accompany the COMPANY'S remittance
copy o f the P o l i c y . A Commitment or f x a n m e r ' s report w i l l not be requir*»a
on a subsequent i s s u a n c e i n a subdivi«ion where a Commitment or Lxamm^r's
report on the base t i t l e t o t h e subdivision has been previously furnished
t o the C0:iPAJY; provided however, the AGE'JT must c e r t i f y to the COMPANY in
w r i t i n g as to *uch subsequent issuance that no instrument a f f e c t i n g t i t l e
t o s a i d property has been f i l e d for record s i n c e the date of the base
Commitment or Examiner's r e p o r t . Where <\ifh Coinmitr -nt or Examiner'*; r i n i f
i s based in an abs t j j » £ t j - j ^ p « r e j by_$nmeone other than the-AGENT™ t h e AGE :T
- w i l l «*>»uj*c f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the c o r r e c t n e s s and completeness of such
an a b s t r a c t . The COMPANY s h e l l have the r i g h t t o withdraw a t any time i t s
aoproval of an TxaroJncr t h e r e t o f o r e by i t approved. Any contract with s a i d
APPROVED EXAMINER a»hall be between the AGENT and the s a i d txaminer.
SECTION I I I
The AGrKT a g r e e s t o maintain h i s records and f l i c s s o that such
records and f i l e s « h a l l at a l l time* during the l i f e of t h i s c o n t r a c t be
a v a i l a b l e for i n s p e c t i o n and examination by the COMPANY, and a f t e r termination

of this contract be likewise available for the purposes of auditing financial
accounts or in connection with the settlement of any claim or l o s s .

such Commitments and Policies ate written and issued under and an accordance
with this contract and all general and special laws applicable thereto and
that sucH Commitments and Policies correctly reflect the condition of title
as determined by the examination of such title by an APPROVED OAHINtR, os
hereinbefore specified.
All Commitments and Policies issued under this contract shall oe
signed by the President or Vice President of the COMPANY and shall be
countersigned by an officer or employee of tho AGENT approved by the COMPANY.
SECTION IV iThe^ACTOT agree* to be responsible for the collection of all
px*ni\m
on all Commitments and Policies written by it under this contract.
As between the AGENT and the COMPANY, such premiums r.hall be deemed to have
been received by the AGD1T at the timo of the delivery of the Policies.
The premium to be paid the COMPANY for its Commitments and Policies shall
be as specified by the COMPANY and unless and until changed by the CO^PHI^Y
upon notice to the AGK\"T shall be in accordance with the rates set forth in
the "Schedule of P****-" attached to and ;uaJe part ijereof.
SECTION V
The *^CNT agrees to render a report to COMPANY not later than
the 10th c*y of eaci calendar morth reflecting all policies lMUfc (or f i*
none were issued) during the preceding calendar month, and the underwriterg
risk premiums due COMPANY thereon, together with its check in full payment
for the said underwriting risk premium, to which shall be added, in appropriate cases, the cost of coinsurance or reinsurance as provided in Section I,
an accounting copy of each such Commitment or Policy as issued, a copy of the
APPROVED EXAMINER'S report if no Commitment was issued, and a copy of any
survey made, together with any other special data as may be specifically requested by the COMPANY. Ihe amount-remitted to COMPANY .as the underwriting
-vcisk premium on each policy shall -be
20. % of the rate computed in
--accordance with the "Schedule of Rates'* attached hereto.
SECTION VI. Trie AGENT shall_ be liable to the COMPANY for any loss or
expense wtiich the COMPANY may sustain, whether before or after the termination of this contract, by reason of the issuance of any Commitment or
Policy: {A} in violation of or contrary to this contract; (B) where the
AGENT has omitted any abstract sheets or improperly abstracted any instrument which is the oroximate cause of th*» lnrr— {Q vrhich acoxues by
reason-o£. the improper, irregular or negligent closing of the transaction
oxr.wkieft;the Commitment or Policy is predicated.
SECTION VII
The AGENT shall not be the agent of the COMPANY for the service
of summons or process upon the Company but the AGENT shall immediately notify
the COKPANY at its Nome Office in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas, by registered
mail of any attempted summons or other process upon it as agent of the
COMPANY and the reason therefor, if obtainable.
SECTION VIII
Jt i-; .icrced that the AHOrr shall have no authority to r-jrtsent or in any way to act for the COMPANY in connection with any business or
affairs of the COrtPANY other than title insurance, nor shall the AGENT have
authority to change, alter or amend the terms of any Commitment or Policy
forms supplied by the COMPANY, nor in any way to bind the COMPANY by *n/
representation, promise or otherwise, except in accordance with the tern-.
and conditions of any Commitment or Policy issued on the forms of the COriPAvJY.
The AGENT shall not net for the C0MPA..Y as escrow agent, trustee or financial
representative for the collection, holding, impounding or disbursement of
funds for any person, firm or corporation, nor shall it affirmatively hold
out to the public that it has povcr -io to /»ct. The AGENT *\all be responsible
to truKgwMPANY for £ny loss or dtrme^e incurred -by the COMPANY because of an
tmat&bdrittd act.
SECTION IX
The AGENT agrees to cooperate-with and assict the COMPANY an the
handling And disposition of any claim mane under or in connection with any
COWPl twsjut Otj-Policy issued hereunder. The AGENT shall have no right or
authority to settle, ccnprmisp or dispose of any claim against the COCPAiJY
except when specifically authorized to do so by the COUPAHY. The AGENT
agrees to forward promptly to the COMPANY any and all communications, reports,
a tat M M t* or ^thcr writings or instruments pertaining to any claim reported,
end to Xe*p~the COMPANY fully advised at all times with regard to any such
claim.

nexco.
Mal1
*

titnrr sucn party may cancel this contract by giving, by Registered
3Q day* notice of intention to cancel to the other party.
The AGENT agrees that upon termination of this contract by expiration or otherwise, it will lmnodiately renaer to the COMPANY at it* llomr
Office in Dallas, Dallas County, Me.cas, on accounting of nil unpaid premiums,
and will immediately return to the COMPANY all unused forms, blanks, supplies
and unissued Commitment and Policy forms.
This contract is not assignable by the /'GENT without the written
consent of the COMPANY, and any sale or assignment made of the business of
tha AGENT shall render this contract null and void.

SECTION XI
Mo amendment or modification of this contract, nor any supplemental contracts between the parties hereto, or agreement in conflict with
this contract shall be valid, unless m writing and signed in the same formality
as this contract is signed.
SLCTIG:* XI1
The COMTANY agrees to pay to tne State of
Utah
the
premium tax, if any, assessed against the full gross premium collected by
the COMPANY pursuant to the Schedule of Rates attached hereto. The Aft^JT
agrees to pay all ottu»r tcr.es and fees of ^na^o/cx nature to -ny t«r*irg
authority.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, these presents are signed and sen Is affixed
on this the

ATTEST v

/j' j£>

day of

-}

'Ss<^*>2r

FPH&A/lf.*

, 19 7Z~

US LIFE TITLE INSURANCE COTlPANY^W^/vLLAS

Srcjoetnry

ATTEST:

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY Of UTAH

By: LtL<j,j£i-J #* t-srr/^iy
Secrttaxv
Secretary

By:

/j^^w

/^7

U^/c«o
President

